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 Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in TC Heartland, the 
law of venue in patent infringement actions fluctuated over time. In 
recent history, the Eastern District of Texas became a notoriously 
plaintiff-friendly forum in which to litigate patent infringement 
actions; it was also a widely available choice of forum due to the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's broad reading of the 
patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). However, the Supreme 
Court in TC Heartland adopted its earlier interpretation of the 
patent venue statute that is much narrower than subsequent 
interpretive expansions. 
 This Note surveys and categorizes motions to dismiss and 
motions to transfer on the basis of improper venue in patent 
infringement actions in the post-TC Heartland era through an 
overview of applicable law and an analysis of motion outcomes. 
The Note concludes with an issue-specific explanation of trends in 
such motion outcomes, suggests that the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit's recent decision to place the burden of proof in 
these motions on plaintiffs will result in disproportionate victories 
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for defendants, and proposes strategies for plaintiffs to mitigate 
this burden. 
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   INTRODUCTION 
An examination of proper venue in patent infringement actions 
essentially requires an inquisition into the role of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.1 In the United 
States, in addition to pertinent statutory law, (1) substantive patent 
law is consistently governed by the laws of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the United States Supreme 
Court, and (2) procedural law applicable to patent litigation is 
uniformly governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 
However, local rules of procedure, both in general and specific to 
patent litigation, result in procedural distinctions among federal 
district courts.3 
By adopting a series of plaintiff-friendly rules, the Eastern 
District of Texas became notorious for speedy patent litigation 
beneficial to plaintiffs.4 Judge T. John Ward, in 2001, adopted 
patent rules favorable for plaintiffs, which were later adopted by 
the entire Eastern District of Texas in 2005.5 Benefits to plaintiffs 
included predictability and uniformity brought by the rules, quick 
advancement to trial, large patent infringement damage awards, 
and economic benefits to the nearby localities.6 Forum shopping 
for district courts such as this one, according to Judge Moore of the 
Federal Circuit, is critical to the outcome of the litigation, as the 
party filing the suit and selecting the forum is indicative of the 
outcome of the litigation.7 TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods 
Group Brands LLC, however, has significantly limited the choice 
of forum in patent litigation through the adoption of a restrictive 
interpretation of the applicable patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 
1400(b).8 
 
1 See J. Jonas Anderson, Reining in a “Renegade” Court: TC Heartland and the 
Eastern District of Texas, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1569, 1574 (2018). 
2 See J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 631, 
642–43 (2015). 
3 Id. 
4 See id. at 651–53. 
5 See id. 
6 See id. at 653–54. 
7 See id. at 650. 
8 See generally Jamie McDole et al., Venue Options for Patent Owners After TC 
Heartland and In re Cray, IPWATCHDOG (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.ipwatchdog.com
2019] THE AFTEREFFECTS OF TC HEARTLAND 1029 
 
This Note, in four parts, will (1) survey the current rules 
governing venue in patent infringement actions and post-TC 
Heartland motions to dismiss or transfer on the basis of improper 
venue in accordance with such rules and (2) deduce trends in the 
outcomes of such motions. Part I provides a comprehensive 
examination of the historical and current laws concerning venue in 
patent infringement actions. Part II addresses issues that arise 
directly from the interpretation of the venue statute specific to 
patent infringement actions, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), through an 
overview of applicable law and an analysis of pertinent motion 
outcomes. Part III discusses disputes that arise over venue in patent 
infringement actions beyond the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), also 
through an overview of applicable law and an exploration of 
motion outcomes. Part IV provides a consolidated explanation of 
the trends in venue analysis in patent infringement actions with 
respect to individual issues. It then suggests that the recent 
decision of the Federal Circuit in In re ZTE (USA) Inc.9 to place 
the burden of proof on plaintiffs in such motions will lead to 
frequent victories for defendants and proposes possible strategies 
for plaintiffs to combat defendants’ likely success. 
I. PATENT VENUE LAWS FROM 1789 TO 2017 
The basic procedural requirements for properly filing a patent 
infringement suit in federal court are subject matter jurisdiction, 
personal jurisdiction, and venue.10 Section A describes the history 
of the venue requirement prior to TC Heartland, while Section B 
lays out how TC Heartland has altered the world of patent 
litigation. 
A. Pre-TC Heartland 
The history of the venue requirement begins with Section 11 of 
the Judiciary Act of 1789, which stated that “no civil suit in a 
 
/2017/12/19/venue-options-patent-owners-tc-heartland-re-cray/id=91320/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y6KZ-US5R] (explaining the impact of TC Heartland on patent 
infringement actions). 
9 890 F.3d 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
10 8 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 21.02 (2018). 
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Circuit or District Court shall be brought against an inhabitant of 
the United States by any original process in any other district than 
that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found at 
the time of serving the writ.”11 This statutory provision served to 
jointly set forth the requirements for both personal jurisdiction and 
venue.12 Then, in Chaffee v. Hayward,13 the Supreme Court held 
that this statutory provision applied to all civil suits, including 
patent suits.14 The Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875 
subsequently altered the “against an inhabitant” language of the 
1789 Act to instead read “against any person.”15 Section 373 of the 
Act of 1887 then provided: 
no civil suit shall be brought before either of said 
courts [circuit or district courts] against any person 
by any original process of proceeding in any other 
district than that whereof he is an inhabitant; but 
where the other jurisdiction is founded only on the 
fact that the action is between citizens of different 
States, suit shall be brought only in the district of 
the residence of either the plaintiff or the 
defendant. . . .16 
While this provision first noted the distinction between federal 
question jurisdiction and federal diversity jurisdiction, the Supreme 
Court in In re Hohorst17 also found that the relevant provision of 
the Act of 1887 did not apply to non-resident aliens, which gave 
rise to a split as to whether the statutory provision limited proper 
patent venue in the United States to domestic defendants.18 The 
next relevant statutory innovation, the 1897 Act, broadened 
permissible patent venue to the district that the defendant inhabited 
or the district in which the defendant committed acts of 
 
11 Id. § 21.02(2)(a). 
12 See id. 
13 61 U.S. 208 (1858). 
14 See id. at 216; see also CHISUM, supra note 10, § 21.02(2)(a). 
15 See CHISUM, supra note 10, § 21.02(2)(a). 
16 Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552. 
17 150 U.S. 653 (1893). 
18 See CHISUM, supra note 10, § 21.02(2)(a). 
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infringement and had a regular and established place of business.19 
The Supreme Court in Stonite Products Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co.20 
then found that this provision of the 1897 Act exclusively 
controlled proper venue in suits for patent infringement,21 which is 
a point particularly poignant to the recent TC Heartland decision. 
With the passing of the Judiciary Act of 194822 came a 
considerable overhaul regarding the federal statutory law on 
general venue, providing that a defendant corporation “may be 
sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed 
to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall 
be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue 
purposes.”23 Although this change in the law did not alter the 
federal patent venue statute, the Supreme Court in Fourco Glass 
Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp.24 reiterated the holding in 
Stonite that the federal patent venue statute was the sole and 
exclusive statutory provision governing venue in patent 
infringement suits. In its 1957 opinion, in addition to the above 
holding,25 the Supreme Court held that the residence prong is 
synonymous with “domicile, and, in respect of corporations, 
mean[s] the state of incorporation only.”26 Fourco also added that, 
for venue to be proper, the defendant must either (1) reside in the 
jurisdiction of its incorporation, meaning that it is incorporated in 
the state, or (2) do business and commit an act of infringement in 
the jurisdiction in which the suit is filed.27 
In 1972, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of patent venue 
in suits against non-resident alien defendants in Brunette Machine 
Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc.28 and held that such suits 
may be filed in any district.29 Subsequently, a 1988 amendment to 
 
19 Id. 
20 315 U.S. 561 (1942). 
21 See CHISUM, supra note 10, § 21.02(2)(a). 
22 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2012). 
23 CHISUM, supra note 10, § 21.02(2)(a). 
24 353 U.S. 222 (1957). 
25 Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 229 (1957). 
26 Id. at 226. 
27 See CHISUM, supra note 10, § 21.02(2)(a). 
28 406 U.S. 706 (1972). 
29 See CHISUM, supra note 10, § 21.02(2)(a). 
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the Judicial Code30 stated that, for the purposes of venue, a 
defendant resides in any district in which it is subject to personal 
jurisdiction.31 Despite the Supreme Court’s decision in Fourco, the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in its 1990 VE Holding 
Corp. opinion held that, in light of these amendments to the 
general venue statute, Fourco’s reading of the venue statute 
governing patent infringement actions was an “anomaly,” and 
“venue in a patent infringement case includes any district where 
there would be personal jurisdiction over the corporate defendant 
at the time the action is commenced,” a broader conception of 
venue than that of Fourco.32 The conflict between this broader 
conception of patent venue on the basis of the general venue 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), and VE Holding Corp. and the 
narrower view on patent venue premised on the specific patent 
venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), and Fourco Glass Co. led to 
the Supreme Court’s decision in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods 
Group Brands LLC.33 
Leading into TC Heartland, both 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) and 28 
U.S.C. § 1400(b) were the relevant statutory provisions, in light of 
the conflict as to whether the broader or narrower conception of 
proper venue governed patent infringement actions.34 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1391(c), the general venue provision, provides that defendant 
entities reside in districts in which they are subject to personal 
jurisdiction and that plaintiff entities reside in districts in which 
they maintain their principal place of business.35 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1400(b), the patent venue provision, provides that patent 
infringement actions may be brought in districts in which the 
defendant resides or in districts in which the defendant “has 
committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established 
place of business.”36 
 
30 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2012). 
31 See CHISUM, supra note 10, § 21.02(2). 
32 See VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1582–83 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990). 
33 See generally 137 S.Ct. 1514 (2017); CHISUM, supra note 10, § 21.02(2). 
34 See CHISUM, supra note 10, § 21.02(2). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
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B. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC 
TC Heartland is a landmark Supreme Court case addressing 
the issue of “where proper venue lies for a patent infringement 
lawsuit brought against a domestic corporation.”37 The petitioner, 
TC Heartland, was an Indiana corporation headquartered in 
Indiana that shipped allegedly infringing products into Delaware.38 
The respondent, Kraft Foods, was a Delaware corporation 
principally operating in Illinois.39 Kraft Foods initially filed suit for 
patent infringement against TC Heartland in the District of 
Delaware.40 TC Heartland subsequently filed a motion to dismiss 
or transfer to the Southern District of Indiana on the basis of 
improper venue in Delaware pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), 
claiming that it neither resided in the state of Delaware according 
to the definition of residence in Fourco nor had a regular and 
established place of business in Delaware.41 The District Court for 
the District of Delaware found the arguments put forth by TC 
Heartland unpersuasive, and the Federal Circuit also found the 
same on the premise that 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), as amended, 
amended the definition of “resides” in 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) to 
permit suit to be filed against a defendant in any district in which 
personal jurisdiction over that defendant exists.42 The Supreme 
Court then granted certiorari on the issue.43 
The Supreme Court noted that Fourco “definitively and 
unambiguously held that the word ‘reside[nce]’ in § 1400(b) has a 
particular meaning as applied to domestic corporations: [i]t refers 
only to the [s]tate of incorporation.”44 Since the relevant statutory 
provision was not amended between Fourco and the case at hand, 
and neither party challenged the original Fourco holding, the 
Supreme Court indicated that the only issue, a narrow subsection 
of the broad patent venue issue, to be considered was whether 
 
37 TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. at 1516. 
38 Id. at 1517. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 See id. 
42 See id. at 1517–18. 
43 Id. at 1518. 
44 Id. at 1520. 
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amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) altered 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) as 
well.45 In reversing the Federal Circuit and holding that the 
residence of a corporation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) is 
solely its state of incorporation, the Court reasoned that (1) 
Congress would have provided a clear indication of an interpretive 
change to the patent venue provision contrary to Fourco if it 
intended to make such change, (2) the saving clause in the general 
venue provision renders the provision inapplicable when otherwise 
provided by law, such as in the case of the patent venue provision, 
and (3) Congress did not ratify the VE Holding Corp. decision in 
its amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).46 
II. POST-TC HEARTLAND: CONFLICTS WITHIN 28 U.S.C. § 1400(B) 
Below is an aggregate of the decisions on motions to dismiss 
and/or transfer that are relevant to patent venue analysis in a post-
TC Heartland era.47 
A. Residence 
The statutory provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), outlines the two 
prongs that independently satisfy the proper venue requirement in 
patent infringement actions, one of which is the residence prong.48 
The first prong provides that “[a]ny civil action for patent 
 
45 Id. 
46 See id. at 1520–21. 
47 Note that the decisions on motions to dismiss and/or transfer are all relevant motions 
to the current patent venue analysis, as of April 27, 2018, obtained through Westlaw and 
the docketing system on Bloomberg Law. This material excludes decisions on motions 
prior to the date of the TC Heartland decision, decisions on motions rendered moot based 
on the now current state of the law (for example, pre-In re Micron decisions made on the 
basis of waiver of the venue defense on the assumption that TC Heartland did not 
constitute a change in the law), decisions on motions lacking an analysis of the merits of 
the decision, decisions on motions that have been subsequently overruled, decisions on 
motions and issues that are unopposed or joined by the opposing party, decisions on 
motions in cases not pending at the time of decision, decisions on motions for discovery 
related to venue, decisions on motions that address residence but principally address 
other issues (not included in the residence section), decisions on motions in courts other 
than district courts, and motions filed but not decided. This material includes some 
motions not solely to transfer and/or dismiss but that are still relevant and pertinent to the 
subject. 
48 CHISUM, supra note 10, § 21.02(2)(c). 
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infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the 
defendant resides….”49 The Supreme Court addressed the issue 
again most recently in 2017 in TC Heartland.50 In TC Heartland, 
the Court explicitly reversed the Federal Circuit’s VE Holding 
decision and held that the residence prong of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) 
refers solely to a defendant’s state of incorporation.51 In doing so, 
the Court reasoned that (1) Fourco is the valid and controlling 
precedent, (2) Congress did not intend to change the meaning of 28 
U.S.C. § 1400(b) through its amendments to the general venue 
statute, especially in light of the saving clause in the current 
version of the general venue statute, and (3) Congress did not ratify 
VE Holding.52 
Courts have been forced to reevaluate and alter their former 
analysis of patent venue, with respect to the residence prong, 
following the decision in TC Heartland. 
1. First Circuit 
In Presby Patent Trust v. Infiltrator Water Technologies, LLC, 
Judge John A. Woodcock, Jr. of the United States District Court 
for the District of Maine narrowly evaluated the residence prong of 
the patent venue statute.53 Because the defendant was incorporated 
in Delaware, the court found that it simply did not reside in Maine 
and, therefore, granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for 
improper venue.54 
2. Fifth Circuit 
Although the defendant asserted improper venue based on its 
lack of presence in the Eastern District of Texas in Diem LLC v. 
BigCommerce, Inc., Judge Rodney Gilstrap of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas found venue to be 
proper in the district because the defendant was incorporated in the 
 
49 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012) (emphasis added). 
50 TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at 1520–21. 
51 See id. at 1521.  
52 See id. at 1520–21.  
53 See Presby Patent Tr. v. Infiltrator Water Techs., LLC, No. 2:17-CV-00068-JAW, 
2017 WL 5895127, at *5 (D. Me. Nov. 29, 2017). 
54 See id. at *5–7. 
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state of Texas and therefore resided in each district in the multi-
district state.55 Therefore, the court denied the defendant’s motion 
to dismiss.56 
3. Sixth Circuit 
When faced with the issue of where an unincorporated 
association resides for the purposes of the patent venue statute in 
Maxchief Investments Ltd. v. Plastic Development Group, LLC, 
Judge Thomas W. Phillips of the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Tennessee held that an unincorporated 
association’s residence is its principal place of business and 
therefore found venue to be improper and transferred the case.57 
Judge Timothy S. Black of the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Ohio also found venue to be improper in 
the district in Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Ranir, LLC because the 
defendant was not incorporated in the state.58 
4. Ninth Circuit 
In Jinni Tech Ltd. v. Red.com, Inc., Judge James L. Robart of 
the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Washington similarly found venue to be improper as to one 
defendant because of its incorporation in another state and its lack 
of consent to venue.59 In the same case, the court found venue to 
be proper as to another defendant because of its incorporation in 
the state.60 
Judge S. James Otero of the United States District Court for the 
Central District of California addressed whether a defendant 
resided in the jurisdiction of the court in a multi-district state 
 
55 See Diem LLC v. BigCommerce, Inc., No. 6:17-CV-00186, 2017 WL 3187473, at 
*2–3 (E.D. Tex. July 26, 2017). 
56 See id. at *4. 
57 See Maxchief Invs. Ltd. v. Plastic Dev. Grp., LLC, No. 3:16-CV-63, 2017 WL 
3479504, at *2, *5 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 14, 2017). 
58 See Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Ranir, LLC, No. 1:17-CV-185, 2017 WL 3537197, at 
*3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 17, 2017). 
59 See Jinni Tech Ltd. v. Red.com, Inc., No. C17-0217JLR, 2017 WL 4758761, at *8 
(W.D. Wash. Oct. 20, 2017). 
60 Id. 
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pursuant to the first prong of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) in Realtime Data 
LLC v. Nexenta Systems, Inc.61 The defendant filed a motion to 
dismiss or transfer venue to the Northern District of California 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3).62 In 
considering the motion, the court first reasoned that 28 U.S.C. § 
1400(b) is the sole statute governing patent venue and includes 
language “in the judicial district where the defendant resides.”63 It 
then considered Stonite Prods., which held that the analogous 
statutory language from the time of the decision, “in the district of 
which the defendant is an inhabitant,” meant only the district in 
which the defendant is an inhabitant or resident and not all districts 
of the multi-district state.64 Filing in the defendant’s state of 
incorporation was found to be necessary but not sufficient to 
satisfy the first statutory prong; the filing also had to be done in the 
proper district, which was the defendant’s principal place of 
business.65 In this case, the defendant’s headquarters and principal 
place of business were in the Northern District of California; the 
majority of employees relevant to the patent infringement suit 
worked in the Northern District of California; and the defendant 
had no offices, places of business, property, or employees in the 
Central District of California.66 The court ultimately found that, “in 
the context of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), a corporate defendant ‘resides’ 
only in the state of its incorporation and, within that state, only in 
the judicial district in which it maintains its principal place of 
business” and transferred the case to the Northern District of 
California.67 
The decisions on motions referenced above found proper 
residence to be lacking in five cases and present in two cases.68 
The larger proportion of findings of a lack of proper residence may 
be attributable to filings prior to the TC Heartland decision in 
 
61 See Realtime Data LLC v. Nexenta Sys., Inc., No. CV 2:17–07690 SJO (JCx), 2018 
WL 2724776, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2018). 
62 See id. at *1. 
63 Id. at *2, *3 (emphasis added). 
64 See id. at *3. 
65 See id. at *3. 
66 See id. at *2. 
67 See id. at *4. 
68 See discussion supra notes 53–67. 
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reliance on the former definition of “residence,” as opposed to the 
changed definition of “residence” set forth in TC Heartland. 
TABLE 1: 
 
Proper Residence Absent Proper Residence Present 
5 2 
B. Regular and Established Place of Business 
The second prong of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) requires that a 
defendant, to satisfy proper venue, have a regular and established 
place of business and have committed acts of infringement in the 
relevant district, providing that “[a]ny civil action for patent 
infringement may be brought in the judicial district . . . where the 
defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular 
and established place of business.”69 In declining to issue a writ of 
mandamus ordering the United States District Court for the District 
of Minnesota to dismiss the instant action on the basis of improper 
venue,70 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held the 
proper inquiry regarding the regular and established place of 
business component of the second prong to be not whether the 
defendant has a fixed physical presence in the district but whether 
the “defendant does its business in that district through a 
permanent and continuous presence there.”71 
Following TC Heartland’s  revival of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) and 
the uncertainty regarding the meaning of a regular and established 
place of business,72 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
addressed the issue again and held that a defendant has a regular 
and established place of business in the district if the place of 
business is (1) a physical place in the district; (2) a regular and 
established place of business; and (3) the place of the defendant.73 
Extrapolating upon these requirements, the place must be a 
physical location at which business is conducted but need not be a 
 
69 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012) (emphasis added). 
70 See In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733, 734 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
71 See id. at 737. 
72 See In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
73 Id. at 1360. 
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traditional store or office.74 The place must be regular, in that it is 
steady and consistent, and established, meaning that it is 
sufficiently permanent.75 Lastly, the place must be of the defendant 
and ratified as such and not merely of the defendant’s employee or 
employees.76 This is evidenced through the defendant’s exercise of 
possession or control and is considered in light of property 
ownership, employment conditioned upon employee residence in 
the district, the storage of materials at such place, advertisements 
and representations by the defendant holding the defendant out as 
having a place of business in the district, and comparisons to 
similar places of business in other venues.77 
1. Second Circuit 
After citing the three In re Cray elements in Peerless Network, 
Inc. v. Blitz Telecom Consulting, LLC, Judge J. Paul Oetken of the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
noted that the sole physical presence of the defendant in the 
jurisdiction was a shelf containing telecommunications equipment 
at the place of the plaintiff.78 The court found that this shelf 
satisfied the physical place requirement and the requirement that it 
be of the defendant but that the shelf was not a regular and 
established place of business because no agents of the defendant 
engaged in business from the shelf.79 Therefore, the court found 
the venue to be improper and transferred the case.80 
2. Third Circuit 
The court in Telebrands Corp. v. Illinois Industrial Tool, Inc. 
held that, because the defendant’s primary offices and headquarters 
were in Illinois, its chief financial officer worked from an office in 
Illinois, the defendant was incorporated in Illinois, the majority of 
the defendant’s employees worked in Illinois, and its related 
 
74 Id. at 1362. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 1363. 
77 See id. 
78 See Peerless Network, Inc. v. Blitz Telecom Consulting, LLC, No. 17-CV-1725 
(JPO), 2018 WL 1478047, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2018). 
79 See id. at *3–5. 
80 See id. at *5. 
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individuals and facilities did not exist in New Jersey, the defendant 
did not have a regular and established place of business in New 
Jersey.81 Therefore, Chief Judge Jose L. Linares of the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey found venue to 
be improper and transferred the case.82 
3. Fourth Circuit 
In Flexible Technologies, Inc. v. SharkNinja Operating LLC, 
Magistrate Judge Jacquelyn D. Austin of the United States District 
Court for the District of South Carolina reasoned that merely doing 
business in a jurisdiction is insufficient to establish a regular and 
established place of business in that jurisdiction.83 
In Precision Fabrics Group, Inc. v. Tietex International, Ltd., 
Judge Thomas D. Schroeder of the Middle District of North 
Carolina applied the In re Cray elements but recognized the 
guidance by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit that 
evaluating a regular and established place of business is a fact-
specific inquiry.84 After considering the factors of (1) ownership, 
lease, or control over the premises, (2) employment conditioned on 
residence in the jurisdiction, (3) storage of inventory at the place, 
and (4) representations by the defendant of the place as its place of 
business, the Court found the failure on the third In re Cray 
element to be determinative because the employee’s presence and 
actions in the jurisdiction did not satisfy such.85 Therefore, the 
Court found venue to be improper.86 
4. Fifth Circuit 
Judge Lee H. Rosenthal of the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Texas also applied the In re Cray elements 
 
81 See Telebrands Corp. v. Ill. Indus. Tool, Inc., No. 17-3411 (JLL), 2017 WL 
4157533, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2017). 
82 See id. at *3. 
83 See Flexible Techs., Inc. v. SharkNinja Operating LLC, No. 8:17-CV-00117-DCC, 
2018 WL 1175043, at *4 (D.S.C. Feb. 14, 2018) adopted by No. 8:17-CV-00117-DCC, 
2018 WL 1158425 (D.S.C. Mar. 5, 2018). 
84 See Precision Fabrics Grp., Inc. v. Tietex Int’l, Ltd., Nos. 1:13-CV-645, 1:14-CV-
650, 2017 WL 5176355, at *10 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 7, 2017). 
85 See id. at *11–13. 
86 See id. at *13. 
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in Wet Sounds, Inc. v. Powerbass USA, Inc.87 With respect to the 
first requirement for a physical place in the district, the defendant 
had no physical presence or employees in the district, even though 
the plaintiff alleged that it was interspersed with third-party 
distributors in the district.88 The third factor was also unsatisfied 
because of the lack of physical presence.89 The court found venue 
to be improper and ultimately transferred the relevant claims to the 
Central District of California.90 
In Lites Out, LLC v. OutdoorLink, Inc., Judge Amos L. 
Mazzant of the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Texas found venue in the instant action to be improper and 
transferred the case because the defendant lacked a physical 
presence in the district, as required pursuant to the regular and 
established place of business requirement of the second prong of 
the patent venue statute.91 
Judge Rodney Gilstrap of the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Texas considered a motion to dismiss for 
improper venue in Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Nutanix, Inc.92 In reasoning 
as to whether the defendant had a regular and established place of 
business in the district, the court found In re Cray to be 
particularly relevant because of the factual similarities to the case 
at hand.93 The defendant in that case was a seller of 
supercomputers incorporated in Washington that did not possess 
real estate in the district of suit but that did have a sales 
representative who worked in the district from his private 
residence.94 This representative managed many of the accounts of 
the allegedly infringing products, communicated professionally 
through a phone number from the district, received reimbursement 
 
87 See Wet Sounds, Inc. v. Powerbass USA, Inc., No. H-17-3258, 2018 WL 1811354, 
at *2–3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2018). 
88 Id. at *2. 
89 See id.  
90 See id. at *4. 
91 See Lites Out, LLC v. OutdoorLink, Inc., No. 4:17-CV-00192, 2017 WL 5068348, 
at *4 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2017). 
92 See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Nutanix, Inc., No. 2:17-CV-00174-JRG, slip op. at 1 (E.D. 
Tex. Dec. 6, 2017). 
93 See id. at 3. 
94 See id. at 3–4. 
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for various business activities, generated sales greater than $345 
million, received support from the Minnesota office, could access 
sales materials in his private residence, but did not and could not 
store products in his private residence.95 Based largely upon the 
failure to meet the requirements of a physical presence in the 
district and that the regular and established place of business in the 
district be of the defendant, the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit found the facts of the case insufficient to find a regular and 
established place of business in the district.96 In this case, Judge 
Gilstrap emphasized that none of the private residences of the 
defendant’s employees were the places of the defendant,97 the 
responsibilities of the employees were not related to their residence 
in the district,98 and the relatedness of the employees’ knowledge 
to the alleged patent infringement did not substantiate a defendant 
having a place in the district.99 Therefore, the court found that the 
defendant did not have a regular and established place of business 
in the Eastern District of Texas.100 
Magistrate Judge Kimberly C. Priest Johnson of the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas considered a 
defendant’s motion to dismiss for improper venue in American 
GNC Corp. v. ZTE Corp.101 With respect to the motion regarding 
defendant ZTE USA, which was not incorporated in the state of 
Texas, the court had to consider whether it had a regular and 
established place of business in the Eastern District of Texas.102 
The presence of a call center with many of defendant’s 
representatives, though a third-party call center, was found to 
effectively rebut the defendant’s assertion that it did not have a 
regular and established place of business in the district.103 
 
95 See id. at 4. 
96 See id. at 4–5. 
97 See id. at 6. 
98 See id. at 7. 
99 See id. at 7–8. 
100 See id. at 8. 
101 See Am. GNC Corp. v. ZTE Corp., No. 4:17-CV-00620-ALM-KPJ, 2017 WL 
5163605, at * 1 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2017) adopted by No. 4:17-CV-00620-ALM-KPJ, 
2017 WL 5157700 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2017). 
102 See id. at *3. 
103 See id. at *3–4. 
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Magistrate Judge Johnson, therefore, recommended denial of the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss for improper venue,104 while Judge 
Amos L. Mazzant overruled all relevant defense objections to the 
recommendation, adopted Magistrate Judge Johnson’s report, and 
denied the motion to dismiss for improper venue.105 
In GEODynamics, Inc. v. DynaEnergetics US, Inc., Magistrate 
Judge Roy S. Payne of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Texas held that the testimony of the CEO of the 
defendant that the defendant was moving a distribution center to 
the district was sufficient to find a regular and established place of 
business in the district.106 Therefore, the court denied the defense 
motion to dismiss or transfer the instant action.107 
In Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. FedEx Corp., Judge Rodney 
Gilstrap of the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Texas noted the presence of defendants’ stores and facilities in 
the district and ultimately found that the defendants did have a 
regular and established place of business in the district.108 
5. Sixth Circuit 
In Automated Packaging Systems, Inc. v. Free-Flow Packaging 
International, Inc., Judge Sara Lioi of the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Ohio analyzed and applied the 
three In re Cray elements.109 The court first found that the 
defendant neither had a physical place in the district nor had 
employees who used their homes in the district in a way that would 
constitute a physical place in the district.110 Second, the defendant 
did not have a regular and established place of business in the 
district because the employees living in the district were not 
 
104 See id. at *7. 
105 See Am. GNC Corp. v. ZTE Corp., No. 4:17-CV-00620-ALM-KPJ, 2017 WL 
5157700, at *2–3 (E.D. Tex. Nov 7, 2017). 
106 See GEODynamics, Inc. v. DynaEnergetics US, Inc., No. 2:17-CV-00371-RSP, 
2017 WL 6452803, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2017). 
107 See id. at *2. 
108 Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. FedEx Corp., No. 2:16-CV-00980-JRG, 2017 WL 
5630023, at *17 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2017). 
109 See Automated Packaging Sys., Inc. v. Free-Flow Packaging Int’l, Inc., No. 5:14-
CV-2022, 2018 WL 400326, at *7–10 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 12, 2018). 
110 See id. at *7. 
1044        FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXIX:1025 
 
required to do so.111 Third, any place in the district was not of the 
defendant because (1) it did not have property in the district, (2) 
the employment of the two employees who resided in the district 
was not conditioned on their residence in the district, (3) the homes 
of such employees were not represented as places of business of 
the defendant, (4) an employee’s servicing of customers in the 
district was insufficient to establish it as the defendant’s place 
without ratification by the defendant employer, (5) use of items in 
the district provided by the defendant employer to employees was 
not satisfactory to establish a place of the defendant, and (6) 
equipment provided to customers in the district was not a place 
over which the defendant could exercise authority.112 
Consequently, the court found venue to be improper and 
transferred the case.113 
Because the defendant in JPW Industries, Inc. v. Olympia 
Tools International, Inc. lacked a physical place in the jurisdiction, 
Judge Jon P. McCalla of the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Tennessee held that the defendant lacked a 
regular and established place of business in the district and found 
venue to be improper.114 
6. Seventh Circuit 
Judge Thomas M. Durkin of the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois found that the defendant did not 
have a regular and established place of business in the jurisdiction 
in Talsk Research, Inc. v. Evernote Corp. because it lacked any 
physical place in the district or full-time employees residing in the 
district and merely maintained virtual stores there.115 In response to 
the plaintiff’s assertion regarding the importance of the residents of 
the district who served as community members of the virtual 
stores, the court noted the lack of a fixed physical place in the 
 
111 See id. at *8. 
112 See id. at *8–9. 
113 See id. at *10–11. 
114 See JPW Indus., Inc., v. Olympia Tools Int’l, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-03153-JPM). 2017 
WL 4512501, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 10, 2017). 
115 See Talsk Research, Inc. v. Evernote Corp., No. 16-CV-2167, 2017 WL 4269004, at 
*2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2017). 
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district, the lack of regularity and establishment of the community 
members’ activities in the district, and the lack of the defendant’s 
control over the community members sufficient to constitute any 
of their places being of the defendant.116 
In Niazi v. St. Jude Medical S.C., Inc., Judge James D. Peterson 
of the Western District of Wisconsin held that the defendants did 
not have a regular and established place of business in the district 
because the allegations that the defendants employed sales 
representatives in the jurisdiction and were registered with the state 
merely evidenced that the defendants did business in the 
jurisdiction and not that the defendants had a place of business in 
the jurisdiction.117 Therefore, the court dismissed the case on the 
basis of improper venue.118 
The plaintiff in BillingNetwork Patent, Inc. v. Modernizing 
Medicine, Inc. asserted that the defendant had a regular and 
established place of business in the jurisdiction on the basis of a 
business registration and an agent for service of process in the state 
in addition to a number of employees that worked from their 
homes in the jurisdiction.119 Chief Judge Rubén Castillo of the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 
however, reasoned that (1) doing business in a jurisdiction does not 
establish a physical place in such jurisdiction, and (2) employing 
individuals who work from homes in the jurisdiction is also 
insufficient because the homes are not of the defendant, regardless 
of the listing of the home addresses for workers’ compensation 
purposes.120 The court granted the defense motion to dismiss for 
improper venue.121 
In granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis of 
improper venue in SportPet Designs Inc. v. Cat1st Corp., Judge 
Lynn Adelman of the United States District Court for the Eastern 
 
116 See id. at *3–5. 
117 See Niazi v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., Nos. 17-CV-183-jdp, 17-CV-184-jdp, 17-CV-
185-jdp, 17-CV-283-jdp, 2017 WL 5159784, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 7, 2017). 
118 See id. at *5. 
119 See BillingNetwork Patent, Inc. v. Modernizing Med., Inc., No. 17 C 5636, 2017 
WL 5146008, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2017). 
120 See id. at *2–3. 
121 See id. at *4. 
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District of Wisconsin focused on the three In re Cray elements.122 
Because the regular and established physical place of business in 
the district was of Amazon and not of the defendant, the court held 
venue in the district to be improper, even though the defendant 
shipped its goods through Amazon’s place of business.123 
7. Eighth Circuit 
Judge Susan Richard Nelson of the United States District Court 
for the District of Minnesota also addressed the statutory 
requirement for a regular and established place of business in the 
district in Regents of the University of Minnesota v. Gilead 
Sciences, Inc.124 The court relied upon In re Cray to decide the 
defendant’s motion to transfer venue.125 In noting that the first 
requirement mandates a physical and geographical location in the 
district that need not be fixed but cannot be virtual, Judge Nelson 
found this requirement to be unsatisfied because the defendant’s 
employees did not work in a standalone office in the district and 
did not have homes that functioned as such, and the defendant had 
no secretarial or administrative support in the area.126 With respect 
to the second requirement for a regular and established place of 
business, the court found that the defendant failed to meet this 
requirement, as the relevant employees could move their homes of 
their own volition, and the defendant’s service to customers and 
significant sales figures in Minnesota were insufficient to establish 
such.127 Finally, the court found the defendant’s evidence as to the 
third requirement, that the place in the district be of the defendant, 
insufficient.128 Judge Nelson ultimately granted the motion and 
transferred the case to the Northern District of California.129 
 
122 See SportPet Designs Inc. v. Cat1st Corp., No. 17-CV-0554, 2018 WL 1157925, at 
*3–4 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 2, 2018). 
123 See id. 
124 Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. 3:17-CV-06056-JCS, slip 
op. at 10–20 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 2017). 
125 See id. 
126 See id. at 10–13. 
127 See id. at 14–15. 
128 See id. at 15–20. 
129 See id. at 21. 
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In Post Consumer Brands, LLC v. General Mills, Inc., Judge 
Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr. of the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Missouri held that the defendants did not 
have a regular and established place of business in the jurisdiction 
because the defendants did not have a physical place of business in 
the jurisdiction.130 
8. Ninth Circuit 
Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. of the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of California transferred Gillespie 
v. Prestige Royal Liquors Corp. to the Southern District of New 
York in response to the defendant’s motion to dismiss or transfer 
for improper venue.131 The court found that the defendant did not 
have a regular and established place of business in the district 
because the plaintiff merely alleged acts of infringement in the 
district and did not allege that the defendant had a regular and 
established place of business in the district.132 
Judge Richard A. Jones of the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Washington found venue to be improper in 
Allsop, Inc. v. Ambient Lighting, Inc. because the plaintiff failed to 
allege that the defendant had a physical place that was a regular 
and established place of business in the district.133  Therefore, the 
Court transferred the case.134 
After finding “no factual basis upon which the Court can 
conclude that 3M has ‘a regular and established’ place of business 
in this District, and certainly no basis for concluding that Northstar 
does,” Judge Ronald B. Leighton of the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed the case in 
Westech Aerosol Corp. v. 3M Co.135 
 
130 See Post Consumer Brands, LLC v. Gen. Mills, Inc., No. 4:17-CV-2471 SNLJ, 2017 
WL 4865936, at *2–3 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 27, 2017). 
131 Gillespie v. Prestige Royal Liquors Corp., No. 4:16-CV-02392-HSG., 2017 WL 
3232462, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2017). 
132 See id. 
133 See Allsop, Inc. v. Ambient Lighting, Inc., No. C17-549 RAJ, 2018 WL 828225, at 
*2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 12, 2018). 
134 See id. at *3. 
135 Westech Aerosol Corp. v. 3M Co., No. C17-5067RBL, 2017 WL 6034222, at *2 
(W.D. Wash. Dec. 6, 2017). 
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The issue of the regular and established place of business 
requirement was addressed again by Judge William H. Orrick of 
the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California in Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC.136 The court also 
found that a defendant must have more contact with the district in 
which suit is filed than only doing business or having sales 
representatives or independent dealers present in the district and 
consequently transferred the case to the District of Colorado in 
response to the defendant’s motion to dismiss or transfer.137 
In Reflection, LLC v. Spire Collective LLC, Judge Gonzalo P. 
Curiel of the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of California reasoned that (1) the storage and shipment of the 
defendant’s goods through Amazon fulfillment centers in the 
district did not satisfy the first In re Cray factor; (2) the shipment 
of the defendant’s goods to and from Amazon fulfillment centers 
in the district did not establish a regular and established place of 
business; and (3) the Amazon fulfillment centers were not the 
places of the defendant, even though the defendant paid a monthly 
fee, because the defendant did not control where Amazon directed 
its goods.138 Consequently, the court dismissed the case.139 
Citing the In re Cray requirements in Nike, Inc. v. Skechers 
U.S.A., Inc., Magistrate Judge Paul Papak of the United States 
District Court for the District of Oregon concluded that the 
defendant did not have a regular and established place of business 
in the jurisdiction because it (1) did not have property in the 
district, (2) did not have a license to do business in the district, (3) 
did not have employees residing in the district, and (4) had 
employees that intermittently traveled to the district but used 
 
136 See Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, No. 3:16-CV-00506-WHO, 2018 WL 
317839, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2018). 
137 See id. at *3–4. 
138 See Reflection, LLC v. Spire Collective LLC, No. 17CV1603-GPC(BGS), 2018 WL 
310184, at *2–4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2018). 
139 See id. at *4–5. 
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independent contractors within the district.140 Therefore, the court 
found venue to be improper and transferred the case.141 
After noting the three In re Cray elements, Judge David C. Nye 
of the United States District Court for the District of Idaho 
concluded in CAO Lighting, Inc. v. Light Efficient Design that the 
defendant did not have a regular and established place of business 
in the jurisdiction because (1) its sales representatives were not 
based in Idaho and therefore did not have a physical presence 
there, (2) its distributors’ locations in the district were not of the 
defendant, and (3) neither the website of the defendant listing its 
contacts in the district nor its sales revenue from the district were 
sufficient to establish such.142 
XpertUniverse, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., decided by Judge 
Richard Seeborg of the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California, raised the issue of whether the 
regular and established place of business requirement was met in 
the instant case.143 The court reiterated the In re Cray factors144 
and, in deciding to deny the defendant’s motion to transfer the case 
to Delaware, noted that the defendant did not regularly engage in a 
substantial portion of its business on a permanent basis and at a 
physical location over which the defendant exercises control in 
Delaware.145 
In denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss or transfer the 
case in Plexxikon Inc. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., Judge 
Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. of the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California found the In re Cray requirements 
to be satisfied because the defendant leased and operated 
properties in the district and because there was no nexus 
requirement between the regular and established place of business 
 
140 See Nike, Inc. v. Skechers U.S.A., Inc., No. 3:16-CV-007-PK, 2017 WL 7275389, at 
*6–7 (D. Or. Nov. 14, 2017). 
141 See id. at *8. 
142 See CAO Lighting, Inc. v. Light Efficient Design, No. 4:16-CV-00482-DCN, 2017 
WL 4556717, at *3 (D. Idaho Oct. 11, 2017). 
143 See XpertUniverse, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 3:17-CV-03848-RS, 2017 WL 
4551519, at *2, *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2017). 
144 See id. at *2. 
145 See id. at *4, *6. 
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and the act of infringement requirements under the second prong of 
the patent venue statute.146 
9. Tenth Circuit 
Considering the regular and established place of business 
element of the second prong of the patent venue statute in RMH 
Tech LLC v. PMC Industries, Inc., Judge Christine M. Arguello of 
the United States District Court for the District of Colorado found 
that the defendant lacked a physical place in the district, as it did 
not have any physical or geographical business location in the 
district, and concluded that the defendant did not have a regular 
and established place of business in the district. Therefore, venue 
was improper.147 
Magistrate Judge Michael E. Hegarty of the United States 
District Court for the District of Colorado, in Hildebrand v. 
Wilmar Corp, found that the only possible physical locations in the 
district would be the distributors’ locations, which are not “of the 
defendant” and also may not be regular and established places of 
business.148 Consequently, the court held that the defendant did not 
have a regular and established place of business in the jurisdiction 
and dismissed the case.149 
10. Eleventh Circuit 
In Patent Holder LLC v. Lone Wolf Distributors, Inc., after 
applying the In re Cray requirements and recognizing the intent of 
Congress to limit the venues to which a defendant can be 
subjected, Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr. of the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Florida transferred the case 
because he found the plaintiff’s assertions insufficient to sustain 
 
146 See Plexxikon Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 17-CV-04405-HSG, 2017 WL 
6389674, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2017). 
147 See RMH Tech LLC v. PMC Indus., Inc., No. 16-CV-01762-CMA-KMT, 2018 WL 
1566839, at *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2018). 
148 See Hildebrand v. Wilmar Corp., No. 17-CV-02821-PAB-MEH, 2018 WL 1535505, 
at *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 29, 2018) 
149 See id. at *5. 
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venue.150 The plaintiff claimed that the defendant derived revenue 
from products sold in the jurisdiction and that the defendant’s 
website permitted dealers to sell its products in the jurisdiction.151 
The court rejected the claim because of the lack of a physical place 
in the district.152 
In Townsend v. Brooks Sports, Inc., Judge Sheri Polster 
Chappell of the United States District Court for the Middle District 
of Florida found it clear that the defendant lacked a regular and 
established place of business in the district and noted that it only 
had U.S. facilities in the state of Washington and engaged in all 
activities related to the allegedly infringing product in 
Washington.153 
In ParkerVision, Inc. v. Apple Inc., Judge Brian J. Davis of the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida also 
applied the In re Cray factors in analyzing whether the defendant 
had a regular and established place of business in the district.154 
The court specifically focused on the requirement for a physical 
place in the district, by noting that the defendant had a physical 
and geographical location at which business was done, and the 
requirement that the defendant have a regular and established place 
of business in the district, a fact-specific inquiry.155 Therefore, the 
court denied the defendant’s motions to dismiss and transfer 
venue.156 
The decisions on motions referenced above found a regular and 
established place of business to be lacking in twenty-six cases and 
present in six cases.157 The disparity, as with the disparity in 
outcomes in the cases dealing with residence in a particular venue, 
is likely due to filings in the proper venue pursuant to the pre-TC 
 
150 See Patent Holder LLC v. Lone Wolf Distribs., Inc., No. 17-23060-Civ-Scola, 2017 
WL 5032989, at *5–6, 8–9 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2017). 
151 Id. at *6. 
152 See Id. 
153 See Townsend v. Brooks Sports, Inc., No. 2:17-CV-62-FtM-38MRM, 2017 WL 
6417328, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2017). 
154 ParkerVision, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 3:15-CV-01477-BJD-JRK, 2018 WL 
5084662, at *5–6 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 8, 2018). 
155 See id. at *8–9. 
156 See id. at *11. 
157 See supra notes 78–154. 
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Heartland definition of “residence” but in the improper venue 
pursuant to the TC Heartland definition of “residence” and a 
subsequent attempt to fit the requirements for having a regular and 
established place of business in a particular venue instead. 
Additionally, the decision of the Federal Circuit in In re Cray 
prospectively clarified the requirements for having a regular and 
established place of business in a judicial district and will likely 
equalize the motion outcomes. 
TABLE 2: 
 
Regular and Established Place 
of Business Absent 
Regular and Established Place 
of Business Present 
26 6 
C. Foreign Defendants 
The Court in TC Heartland noted that its decision did not 
address the ramifications of patent venue for foreign defendants158 
and reiterated Fourco’s holding as applied to “domestic 
corporations.”159 The following cases demonstrate the current 
trends of district court venue requirements for foreign defendants. 
1. Third Circuit 
Judge Leonard P. Stark of the United States District Court for 
the District of Delaware reasoned in 3G Licensing, S.A. v. HTC 
Corp. that the general venue statute, rather than the patent venue 
statute, governs venue in patent infringement actions for foreign 
defendants and therefore found that venue was proper in the 
district.160 
2. Fourth Circuit 
In Mya Saray, LLC v. Dabes, Senior Judge Glen E. Corlrad of 
the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia 
 
158 See TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1520 n.2 
(2017). 
159 See id. at 1520. 
160 See 3G Licensing, S.A. v. HTC Corp., No. 17-83-LPS-CJB, 2017 WL 6442101, at 
*2 (D. Del. Dec. 18, 2017). 
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reiterated that the patent venue statute applies exclusively to 
domestic corporations and therefore held that the foreign defendant 
in the instant case could be sued in any judicial district, pursuant to 
the general venue provision.161 
3. Ninth Circuit 
As the defendants were foreign defendants in Red.com, Inc. v. 
Jinni Tech Ltd., Judge Cormac J. Carney of the United States 
District Court for the Central District of California found that the 
patent venue statute did not apply and found venue to be proper.162 
The decisions on the three motions referenced above all found 
venue to be proper as to the foreign defendant(s).163 Although the 
motion outcomes with respect to foreign defendants were the same, 
the sample size is small, and TC Heartland did not affect the venue 
analysis with respect to foreign defendants. 
TABLE 3: 
 
Patent Venue Statute Applicable 
to Foreign Defendants 
General Venue Statute 
Applicable to Foreign 
Defendants 
0 3 
D. Acts of Infringement 
The second component of the second prong of 28 U.S.C. § 
1400(b), which provides that “[a]ny civil action for patent 
infringement may be brought in the judicial district . . . where the 
defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular 
and established place of business,”164 requires that a defendant 
have committed acts of infringement in the relevant district.165 
Sufficient acts of infringement are making, using, offering to sell, 
 
161 See Mya Saray, LLC v. Dabes, No. 3:17CV00016, 2018 WL 1161145, at *5–6 
(W.D. Va. Mar. 5, 2018). 
162 See Red.com, Inc. v. Jinni Tech Ltd., No. SACV 17-00382-CJC(KESx), 2017 WL 
4877414, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2017). 
163 See supra notes 158–60. 
164 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012) (emphasis added). 
165 CHISUM, supra note 10, § 21.02(2)(e). 
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selling, or importing any patented invention into the United 
States;166 inducement of patent infringement;167 and contributory 
patent infringement.168 However, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) does provide 
that making, using, offering to sell, selling, or importing a patented 
invention into the United States, which would otherwise constitute 
an act of infringement, is not an act of infringement if such act is 
done “solely for uses reasonably related to the development and 
submission of information under a [f]ederal law which regulates 
the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological 
products.”169 This carve-out provision does have exclusions, 
including Abbreviated New Drug Applications (“ANDAs”) made 
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act that have the purpose of obtaining “approval under 
such Act to engage in the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of 
a drug, veterinary biological product, or biological product claimed 
in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent before the 
expiration of such patent.”170 
1. Third Circuit 
In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
Judge Leonard P. Stark of the United States District Court for the 
District of Delaware was presented with the issue of how the 
Hatch-Waxman Act171 interacts with the acts of infringement 
requirement pursuant to the second prong of the patent venue 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).172 In considering this issue, the court 
first addressed the “has committed” language in the patent venue 
statute and recognized an inherent temporal discord between the 
patent venue statute, which concerns the past or present, and the 
 
166 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
167 See id. § 271(b). 
168 See id. § 271(c); CHISUM, supra note 10, § 21.02(2)(e). 
169 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). Note that this excludes animal drugs and veterinary 
biological products “primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant 
RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes involving site specific genetic 
manipulation techniques.” Id. 
170 Id. § 271(e)(2). 
171 The Hatch-Waxman Act is a variety of amendments to the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act, which is chapter 9 of title 21 of the United States Code. 
172 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., No. 17-379-LPS, 2017 WL 
3980155, at *6 (D. Del. Sept. 11, 2017). 
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Hatch-Waxman Act, which concerns future acts.173 While noting 
that an ANDA submission constitutes an artificial act of 
infringement that triggers the ability to file suit for patent 
infringement prior to the introduction of a generic pharmaceutical 
into the market, the court reasoned that, “in a Hatch-Waxman 
lawsuit, the patent infringement inquiry is necessarily based on 
future events that will occur following FDA approval, events that 
have not yet actually occurred” and requires “the same type of 
analysis involved in a typical patent infringement inquiry.”174 
Consequently, the court found that it necessarily follows that the 
ANDA submission is the triggering act for the availability of a 
patent infringement suit but that considerations of the intent to 
market the allegedly infringing product are also relevant to the 
venue analysis.175 In reaching his conclusion with respect to this 
issue, Judge Stark considered the above reasoning in conjunction 
with a number of other factors.176 He additionally considered 
future intended acts by an ANDA filer in the personal jurisdiction 
analysis by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 
Acorda.177 The third consideration was the finding that the acts of 
infringement requirement pursuant to the second prong of the 
patent venue statute is applicable to Hatch-Waxman cases, even 
though there will never be an actual act of infringement in such a 
case.178 Finally, Judge Stark considered the lack of compelling 
alternative conclusions and interpretations, including the assertion 
that the proper venue for a case such as this is the jurisdiction from 
which an ANDA submission is made, made from, or prepared.179 
In concluding that the defendant did not sufficiently demonstrate 
that it had not committed acts of infringement in the jurisdiction, 
the court held that the above considerations could be sufficient to 
evidence the commission of acts of infringement in the district.180 
 
173 See id. 
174 See id. at *8. 
175 See id. 
176 See id. at *8–12. 
177 See id. at *8–9. 
178 See id. at *10. 
179 See id. at *11. 
180 See id. at *13. 
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Judge Esther Salas of the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey was faced with the same issue of what acts 
by ANDA filers constitute acts of infringement sufficient to sustain 
proper venue in a patent infringement suit in Celgene Corp. v. 
Hetero Labs Ltd.181 While the defendant argued that the “has 
committed” language in the patent venue statute expressly refers 
only to past acts, the plaintiff argued that the factual circumstances 
common to Hatch-Waxman cases necessarily require consideration 
of intended future acts following prospective ANDA approval.182 
The court found the plaintiff’s argument to align with BMS, but the 
defendant argued that the BMS decision preceded the decision by 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in In re Cray, which 
concluded that courts must not conflate the standards for proper 
venue and for personal jurisdiction, and, therefore, should not be 
followed.183 However, the court did not find the defendant’s 
argument convincing because other district courts in the circuit 
continued to follow BMS after In re Cray.184 Therefore, the court 
found that the defendant did not show that it had not committed 
acts of infringement in New Jersey and also denied the motion to 
dismiss for improper venue.185 
2. Fourth Circuit 
In Symbology Innovations, LLC v. Lego Systems, Inc., Judge 
Arenda L. Wright Allen of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia found allegations of infringement to be 
sufficient to sustain venue pursuant to the second prong of the 
patent venue statute.186 
3. Fifth Circuit 
Chief Judge Barbara M.G. Lynn of the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Texas considered and decided a 
 
181 See Celgene Corp. v. Hetero Labs Ltd., No. 17-3387 (ES) (MAH), 2018 WL 
1135334, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 2, 2018). 
182 See id. 
183 See id. 
184 See id. 
185 See id. at *3, *5. 
186 See Symbology Innovations, LLC v. Lego Sys., Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 916, 928 (E.D. 
Va. 2017). 
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motion to dismiss for improper venue in a Memorandum Opinion 
and Order in Galderma Laboratories, L.P. v. Teva 
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.187 Considering Teva’s motion to 
dismiss for improper venue,188 the court was faced with the issue 
of what acts by an ANDA filer, whose application contains a 
Paragraph IV certification (certification “that a patent is invalid, 
unenforceable, or will not be infringed”),189 sufficiently constitute 
acts of infringement in a particular jurisdiction.190 The court 
recognized that the filing of an ANDA containing a Paragraph IV 
certification, a certification by an ANDA filer as to patent 
invalidity, unenforceability, or non-infringement, is an act of 
infringement, but it then noted that whether the mere intent to 
market the allegedly infringing product in a particular jurisdiction 
in itself constitutes an act of infringement was still an unanswered 
inquiry.191 In addressing this issue, the court noted problems with a 
decision by the United States District Court for the District of 
Delaware, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., which held that steps indicating the future intent of the 
ANDA filer to market the allegedly infringing product in a 
particular jurisdiction are sufficient to sustain proper venue with 
respect to the requirement for acts of infringement.192 First, the 
court reasoned that such a reading of the patent venue statute is 
plainly contradictory to the statute’s plain language when it uses 
the phrase “has committed.”193 Chief Judge Lynn noted that this 
reading is supported by the guidance from the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court to avoid a liberal 
interpretation of the patent venue statute.194 Second, the court 
rejected the assertion that reading additional and future-oriented 
acts of infringement into the statute is required to effectuate all of 
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2), as “[t]he statute itself recognizes the 
 
187 See Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 3:17-CV-01076-M, 2017 
WL 6505793, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2017). 
188 See id. 
189 See id. at *2. 
190 See id. at *2, *4. 
191 See id. at *4. 
192 See id. at *4–5. 
193 See id. at *5. 
194 See id. 
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forward-looking nature of the litigation and identifies the ANDA 
submission as an artificial act of infringement on which a lawsuit 
can be based.”195 Finally, the court criticized the Delaware Court’s 
conflation of standards for personal jurisdiction with standards for 
proper venue.196 The court then affirmatively provided that, “[i]n 
determining proper venue in a Hatch-Waxman Act case, it is 
appropriate to look to the forum where the ANDA submission 
itself was prepared and submitted.”197 Because of the failure to 
establish the occurrence of an act of infringement in the 
jurisdiction, the court granted the motion to dismiss on the basis of 
improper venue.198 
Judge Rodney Gilstrap of the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Texas in Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. 
FedEx Corp. outlined the requirement for acts of infringement 
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 271.199 The defendants argued that the 
plaintiff failed to make a plausible allegation of infringement and 
impermissibly grouped all defendants into a single entity for the 
purposes of the alleged infringement.200 However, the court found 
the arguments unpersuasive because the plaintiff identified specific 
entities and paired them with specific acts of infringement in some 
circumstances, and the defendants acknowledged the existence of 
the alleged conduct in the district.201 On the basis of this analysis, 
the court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss on the basis of 
improper venue.202 
Magistrate Judge Kimberly C. Priest Johnson of the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas addressed the 
issue of the requirement for acts of infringement pursuant to the 
second prong of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) in her Order and Report and 
Recommendation on the motion to dismiss for improper venue in 
 
195 See id. at *6. 
196 See id. 
197 See id.. 
198 See id. at *7. 
199 See Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. FedEx Corp., No. 2:16-CV-00980-JRG, 2017 
WL 5630023, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2017). 
200 See id. 
201 See id. at *8–9. 
202 See id. at *1, *9. 
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Snyders Heart Valve LLC v. St Jude Medical S.C., Inc.203 Though 
the defendants admitted to activity in the district solely in the form 
of clinical trials, they contended that this action was insufficient to 
establish acts of infringement in the district because the acts were 
not infringing pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).204 The plaintiff, 
by contrast, asserted that the defendants’ affirmative defense was 
irrelevant to the venue determination, relying principally upon 
Amgen, Inc. v. International Trade Commission, 565 F.3d 846 
(Fed. Cir. 2009), and Ventrassist Pty Ltd. v. Heartware, Inc., 377 
F. Supp. 2d 1278 (S.D. Fla. 2005); the courts in these cases held, 
respectively, that a dispute as to the application of a safe harbor 
exemption concerns the merits of the claims and that a plaintiff 
need not negate an affirmative defense to prevail on a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim.205 The court found these cases 
raised by the plaintiff to be persuasive, and it recommended that 
the defendants’ motions to reconsider their previous motion to 
dismiss on the basis of improper venue be denied.206 Judge Amos 
L. Mazzant overruled all defense objections to the Order and 
Report and Recommendation by Magistrate Judge Johnson and 
denied the defendants’ motions.207 
4. Sixth Circuit 
Magistrate Judge Karen L. Litkovitz of the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio found that 
unsupported allegations of infringement by the plaintiff in Stuebing 
Automatic Machine Co. v. Gavronsky did not sufficiently satisfy 
the acts of infringement requirement pursuant to the second prong 
of the patent venue statute.208 
 
203 See Snyders Heart Valve LLC v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., No. 4:16-CV-00812-
ALM-KPJ, 2017 WL 4563076, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2017), adopted by No. 
4:16CV812, 2017 WL 4552517 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 2017). 
204 See id. at *3–4. 
205 See id. at *5. 
206 See id. at *5–6. 
207 See Snyders Heart Valve LLC v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., No. 4:16CV812, 2017 
WL 4552517, at *1–2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 2017). 
208 See Stuebing Automatic Mach. Co. v. Gavronsky, No. 1:16-CV-576, 2017 WL 
3187049, at *3 (S.D. Ohio June 12, 2017). 
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5. Seventh Circuit 
In deciding whether the defendant had committed sufficient 
acts of infringement to sustain a patent infringement action in the 
district pursuant to the second prong of the patent venue statute in 
RAH Color Technologies, LLC v. Quad/Graphics, Inc., Judge Amy 
J. St. Eve of the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois reasoned that the plaintiff’s allegations of 
infringement through the use of the allegedly infringing software 
in the district was sufficient to sustain the suit.209 The court 
therefore denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis of 
improper venue.210 
6. Ninth Circuit 
In Prolacta Bioscience, Inc. v. Ni-Q, LLC, Judge S. James 
Otero of the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California considered the standard for the requirement of acts of 
infringement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).211 Considering the 
requirement for acts of infringement in the district for proper 
venue, the court noted that the complaint had no allegations of 
substantive acts of infringement in the district, customers in the 
district, offers for sale in the district, or hospital or clinic 
distributors in the district.212 In addition, the defendant could not 
legally sell or offer for sale the allegedly infringing product in the 
district or state because it required licensed sale at tissue banks, not 
had or done by the defendant.213 Judge Otero also particularly 
noted that distribution of promotional materials in the district did 
not qualify as an offer for sale.214 The court granted the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis of improper venue 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(3).215 
 
209 See RAH Color Techs., LLC v. Quad/Graphics, Inc., No. 17 C 4931, 2018 WL 
439210, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2018). 
210 See id. at *3. 
211 See Prolacta Bioscience, Inc. v. Ni-Q, LLC, No. CV 17-04071 SJO (Ex), 2017 WL 
5664985, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2017). 
212 See id. 
213 See id. at *5. 
214 See id. 
215 See id. at *1, *7–8. 
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In denying the defendants’ motions to dismiss on the basis of 
improper venue in IPS Group, Inc. v. CivicSmart, Inc., Judge 
Cathy Ann Bencivengo of the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of California concluded that allegations of 
infringement in the district, bolstered by factual support on the 
basis of information and belief of the plaintiff, were sufficient to 
sustain venue.216 
In Plexxikon Inc. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., Judge 
Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. of the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California reasoned that allegations of 
infringement in the district, through sales and offers for sale of the 
allegedly infringing product, were sufficient to satisfy the 
requirement of an act of infringement pursuant to the second prong 
of the patent venue statute.217 
7. Eleventh Circuit 
In Townsend v. Brook Sports, Inc., Judge Sheri Polster 
Chappell of the United States District Court for the Middle District 
of Florida found venue to be improper on the basis that the alleged 
acts of infringement that occurred were in Washington or in 
foreign countries.218 
In Patent Holder LLC v. Lone Wolf Distributors, Inc., because 
the plaintiff alleged infringing offers for sale and sales in its 
complaint, Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr. of the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Florida found that it satisfied the 
acts of infringement requirement of the second prong of the patent 
venue statute.219 
The decisions on motions referenced above found acts of 
infringement to be lacking in four cases and present in nine 
 
216 See IPS Grp., Inc. v. CivicSmart, Inc., No. 17-CV-0632-CAB (MDD), 2017 WL 
4810099, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2017). 
217 See Plexxikon Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 17-CV-04405-HSG, 2017 WL 
6389674, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2017). 
218 See Townsend v. Brooks Sports, Inc., No. 2:17-CV-62-FtM-38MRM, 2017 WL 
6417328, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2017). 
219 See Patent Holder LLC v. Lone Wolf Distribs., Inc., No. 17-23060-Civ-Scola, 2017 
WL 5032989, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2017). 
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cases.220 The standard for determining the existence of acts of 
infringement also remained unaffected by the TC Heartland 
decision, and the distinctions in motion outcomes must therefore 
be attributable to other forces. 
TABLE 4: 
 
Acts of Infringement Absent Acts of Infringement Present 
4 9 
III. POST-TC HEARTLAND: CONFLICTS IN ASSERTING AND 
DEFENDING AGAINST IMPROPER VENUE CLAIMS 
A. Waiver or Forfeiture of Venue 
“Improper venue is a defense and will be deemed waived by 
the defendant if not raised in a timely fashion.”221 Such waiver can 
come in the form of either failure to comply with Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12 or by litigation conduct prior to making an 
objection on the basis of improper venue.222 With respect to a 
procedural waiver, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) provides 
in pertinent part: 
A motion asserting any of these defenses [including 
improper venue] must be made before pleading if a 
responsive pleading is allowed.  If a pleading sets 
out a claim for relief that does not require a 
responsive pleading, an opposing party may assert 
at trial any defense to that claim.  No defense or 
objection is waived by joining it with one or more 
other defenses or objections in a responsive 
pleading or in a motion.223 
With respect to the possibility of waiver by litigation conduct, 
steps found to be sufficient include a motion for summary 
 
220 See supra text accompanying notes 170–217. 
221 CHISUM, supra note 10, § 21.02(2)(g). 
222 See Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. FedEx Corp., No. 2:16-CV-00980-JRG, 2017 
WL 5630023, at *2–4 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2017). 
223 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b). 
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judgment, participation in another party’s motion to change venue 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), and a motion to set aside a 
decree.224 
In the instance of waiver as related to TC Heartland, the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded in In re Micron that 
the TC Heartland decision represented a change in the law and 
made available an objection on the basis of improper venue that 
was not available prior to TC Heartland, rendering waiver pursuant 
to Rule 12 inapplicable under the circumstances.225 However, the 
court found that “district courts have authority to find forfeiture of 
a venue objection” and, after noting the considerations of 
timeliness, consent, and “wait-and-see” tactical strategies, declined 
to identify “what if any other considerations could justify a finding 
of forfeiture even when the defendant has not waived its objection 
under Rule 12(g)(2) and (h)(1)(A).”226 
1. Third Circuit 
Judge Richard G. Andrews of the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware noted in T-Jat Systems 2006 Ltd. v. 
Expedia, Inc. (DE) that, while “a party may not bring a venue 
defense it could have raised in its first responsive pleading” under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12, this Rule is excepted if the 
venue defense was unavailable when the first responsive pleading 
was filed.227 Since the venue defense here was unavailable when 
the defendant filed its answer and pre-answer motion, the venue 
defense was not waived.228 
Judge Leonard P. Stark of the United States District Court for 
the District of Delaware found the objection to venue to be timely 
in 3G Licensing, S.A. v. HTC Corp.229 Judge Stark similarly 
 
224 See CHISUM, supra note 10, § 21.02(2)(g) n.123 (quoting Marquest Med. Prod., Inc. 
v. EMDE Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1242, 1245 (D. Colo. 1980)). 
225 See In re Micron Tech., Inc., 875 F.3d 1091, 1095–1101 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
226 See id. at 1101–02. 
227 See T-Jat Sys. 2006, Ltd. v. Expedia, Inc. (DE), No. 16-581-RGA, 2018 WL 
1525496, at *7 (D. Del. Mar. 28, 2018). 
228 See id. 
229 See 3G Licensing, S.A., v. HTC Corp., No. 17-83-LPS-CJB, 2017 WL 6442101, at 
*1 (D. Del. Dec. 18, 2017). 
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reasoned that the venue objection was unavailable prior to the TC 
Heartland decision.230 
Judge Sherry R. Fallon of the United States District Court for 
the District of Delaware found no waiver or forfeiture of venue in 
Treehouse Avatar LLC v. Valve Corporation.231 Because In re 
Micron held TC Heartland to be an intervening change in the law, 
the court concluded that there had been no waiver of the venue 
objection.232 Additionally, the venue defense had not been 
forfeited, given the narrow ability to find forfeiture, because trial 
was not immediately impending, the defendant previously 
contested venue, and the defendant timely asserted its venue 
defense following TC Heartland and otherwise.233 
In Infinity Computer Products, Inc. v. OKI Data Americas, 
Inc., the plaintiff asserted that the defendants waived the improper 
venue defense because of (1) the six-month period between the TC 
Heartland decision and the filing of the motions on the basis of 
improper venue and (2) the other motions that did not include the 
improper venue objections.234 Judge Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro 
of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania recognized that waiver is possible regardless of the 
In re Micron decision.235 However, with respect to the first 
assertion, given that the delays in the filing of motions following 
the lifting of the stays in the cases were only in the range of three 
to five months and that the cases were relatively inactive during 
the delay periods, the venue objection was not waived.236 The 
second alleged basis for waiver, the lack of inclusion of objections 
to improper venue in the prior motions filed for failure to 
prosecute, was not a sufficient basis for establishing the waiver of 
the improper venue objection because the motions were not 
 
230 See id. 
231 See Treehouse Avatar LLC v. Valve Corp., No. 15-427-JFB-SRF, 2017 WL 
5564153, at *3 (D. Del. Nov. 20, 2017) adopted by No. 1:15CV427, 2017 WL 6210506 
(D. Del. Dec. 8, 2017). 
232 Id. 
233 Id. 
234 See Infinity Comput. Prods., Inc. v. OKI Data Ams., Inc., Nos. 12-6797, 12-6799, 
12-6800, 12-6806, 2018 WL 1035793, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2018) 
235 See id. 
236 See id. 
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substantive and were merely filed in response to a perceived 
abandonment of the cases by the plaintiff.237 The court rejected the 
plaintiff’s assertion that the defendants forfeited the venue 
objection based on their active litigation participation, reasoning 
that the conduct of the defendants after and not before the TC 
Heartland decision was pertinent to the inquiry and that such 
conduct was only the motions for failure to prosecute and 
compliance with a court order.238 
In Boston Scientific Corp. v. Cook Group Inc., Judge Leonard 
P. Stark of the United States District Court for the District of 
Delaware held that the defendants had not waived their venue 
challenge.239 In making such decision, the court reasoned that the 
trial in the instant case was more than six months away and would 
likely be delayed because of a stay, the defendants filed the instant 
motion only one month after the TC Heartland decision, the 
plaintiffs would not suffer undue prejudice on the basis of transfer 
of venue, and the defense participation in the litigation should not 
be held against it as it was court-ordered.240 Therefore, Judge Stark 
transferred the case.241 
2. Fourth Circuit 
Judge Richard L. Voorhees of the United States District Court 
for the Western District of North Carolina held that the defendant 
had not waived its venue objection.242 The basis for this conclusion 
was that the defendant in Simpson Performance Products, Inc. v. 
NecksGen, Inc. filed its motion to dismiss on the basis of improper 
venue only two weeks after the TC Heartland decision, the instant 
case was in an early procedural posture, the plaintiff did not assert 
prejudice by the raising of the motion at this stage, and transfer 
 
237 See id. at *6. 
238 See id. at *6–7. 
239 See Bos. Sci. Corp. v. Cook Grp. Inc., 269 F. Supp. 3d 229, 243 (D. Del. 2017). 
240 See id. 
241 See id. at 251. 
242 See Simpson Performance Prods., Inc. v. NecksGen, Inc., No. 5:16-CV-00153-RLV-
DCK, 2017 WL 3616764, at *7–8 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 23, 2017). 
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would not pose a risk to the plaintiff of a statute of limitations 
bar.243 Therefore, the court transferred the case.244 
Chief Judge Frank D. Whitney of the United States District 
Court for the Western District of North Carolina concluded that the 
defendant in Eyetalk365, LLC v. Skybell Technologies, Inc. waived 
its venue challenge because it proceeded with the litigation for 
over two months following the TC Heartland decision and prior to 
filing its motion on the basis of improper venue.245 
In Cobalt Boats, LLC v. Brunswick Corp., Senior Judge Henry 
Coke Morgan, Jr. of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia found that the defendant forfeited its 
venue defense because the instant motion was untimely, as the 
defendant did not “adequately contest venue” prior to the case 
reaching “the point of no reasonable return,” and was one of a 
series of delay tactics in the case.246 
3. Fifth Circuit 
Judge Vanessa D. Gilmore of the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of Texas found in BASF Corp. v. SNF 
Holding Co. that the defendants did not waive their venue defense 
by failing to raise such pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).247 
Therefore, the court granted the defense motion for reconsideration 
and transferred the case.248 
In Nichia Corp. v. Vizio, Inc., Judge Rodney Gilstrap of the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas 
addressed motions to dismiss or transfer for improper venue made 
by the defendants.249 The plaintiff argued for a narrow reading of 
 
243 See id. at *7. 
244 See id. at *8. 
245 See Eyetalk365, LLC v. Skybell Techs., Inc., No. 3:16-CV-00702-FDW-DCK, 2017 
WL 3669548, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 24, 2017). 
246 See Cobalt Boats, LLC v. Brunswick Corp., No. 2:15CV21, 2017 WL 6034504, at 
*12–13 (E.D. Va. Dec. 4, 2017). 
247 See BASF Corp. v. SNF Holding Co., No. 4:14-CV-2733, 2017 WL 7790618, at *1 
(S.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2017). 
248 See id. 
249 See Nichia Corp. v. Vizio, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-01453-JRG, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Tex. 
Feb. 2, 2018). 
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In re Micron on the basis that the objection to venue became 
available upon TC Heartland’s filing of a petition for certiorari at 
the U.S. Supreme Court on September 12, 2016.250 The plaintiff 
also asserted that failure to assert such an objection to venue in a 
responsive pleading when there is a good-faith argument for 
making a change in the law constitutes a waiver.251 However, the 
court rejected these arguments, noting that the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit has found waiver arguments to be excepted 
in light of the intervening change of law in TC Heartland.252 In 
observing that the defendants also had not committed non-Rule 12 
waivers, Judge Gilstrap found venue to be improper and granted 
the defendants Feit, Vizio, and LG Sourcing’s motions to 
dismiss.253 
In Blue Spike, LLC v. Nook Digital, LLC, Magistrate Judge 
John D. Love of the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Texas found that the defendant did not waive its venue 
objection, as there had not been extensive litigation in the case, and 
the plaintiff’s allegation that the timing of the defendant’s instant 
motion was made in bad faith was unsubstantiated.254 
In Kaist IP US LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co., Magistrate 
Judge Roy S. Payne of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Texas issued a Report and Recommendation 
with respect to the two defendants’ motions to dismiss or transfer 
 
250 See id. at 7. 
251 See id. at 7–8. 
252 See id. at 9.  The court noted that this rejection is consistent with Federal Circuit 
precedents in In re Cutsforth, Inc., 2017 WL 5907556 (Fed. Cir. 2017), which held that 
failure to assert an improper venue defense at the initial stages of litigation prior to TC 
Heartland did not constitute a waiver, and in In re Fluidmaster, Inc., No. 18-109 (Fed. 
Cir. Jan. 17, 2018), which similarly held that failure to assert an improper venue defense 
in a responsive pleading or amendment permitted as a matter of course did not constitute 
a waiver because such a defense was barred at the time the objection would have been 
proper.  See id. at 8–9. 
253 See id. at 10–11. 
254 See Blue Spike, LLC v. Nook Dig., LLC, No. 6:16-CV-1361-RWS-JDL, 2017 WL 
3263871, at *3 (E.D. Tex. July 28, 2017), adopted by sub nom. Blue Spike, LLC v. 
Caterpillar, Inc., No. 6:16-CV-1361-RWS, 2017 WL 4129321 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2017). 
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on the basis of improper venue.255 In addressing when a defendant 
waives the defense of improper venue in a patent infringement suit, 
the court noted four circumstances under which a defendant may 
waive such a defense: (1) failure to move the court pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(1)(B)(i); (2) failure to object 
to venue in a responsive pleading or amendment permitted under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1) as a matter of course; (3) 
failure to object to venue when moving the court pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 for reasons other than venue; 
and (4) litigating a case, even after an initial objection to venue.256 
The court found the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s 
suggestion that courts consider waiver of the venue defense in the 
time frame from when the defense became available to when the 
defense is asserted instructive.257 Because of the defendants’ 
respective delays of approximately four and five months following 
the Supreme Court’s decision in TC Heartland and the litigation 
schedule, regardless of the discussions with plaintiff Kaist 
concerning venue alternatives, Judge Payne recommended the 
denial of the motions.258 
Judge Rodney Gilstrap of the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Texas addressed the defendants’ motions to 
dismiss on the basis of improper venue in Intellectual Ventures II 
LLC v. FedEx Corp.259 While recognizing the recent decision by 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in In re Micron, the 
court noted that the power to find a waiver of the venue defense on 
the basis of conduct or circumstances outside the purview of the In 
re Micron decision remained within the province of district 
courts.260 Noting the instructions by the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit to consider the possibility of such a waiver from 
the time the defense becomes available, the court in the instant 
 
255 See KAIST IP US LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2:16-CV-01314-JRG-RSP, 2017 
WL 7058227, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2017) adopted by No. 2:16-CV-01314-JRG-RSP, 
2018 WL 2731932 (E.D. Tex. June 6, 2018). 
256 See id. 
257 See id. at *1–2. 
258 See id. at *2. 
259 See Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. FedEx Corp., No. 2:16-CV-00980-JRG, 2017 
WL 5630023, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2017). 
260 See id. at *3. 
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case looked to the defendant’s conduct after the date of the TC 
Heartland decision.261 The defendants actively continued with the 
litigation for months by, for example, serving subpoenas, filing 
responsive briefings, and engaging in claim constructions.262 
Additionally, the defendants filed a motion to transfer the case to 
another jurisdiction on a basis other than improper venue, 28 
U.S.C. § 1404, prior to the TC Heartland decision but did not raise 
the issue of improper venue, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406, which 
led to the appearance that the defendants intended to defend the 
case on the merits.263 In light of this analysis, the court concluded 
that the defendants had waived their objection to venue based upon 
their conduct, judicial economy interests, and potential prejudice to 
the plaintiff.264 
4. Sixth Circuit 
In considering the waiver issue in Automated Packaging 
Systems, Inc. v. Free-Flow Packaging International, Inc., Judge 
Sara Lioi of the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio found that (1) concessions made by the defendant 
that venue was proper prior to TC Heartland were of no effect 
because they were made when the defense was unavailable; (2) the 
defendant did not unreasonably delay its objection to venue, as it 
filed its motion to dismiss for improper venue within one month of 
the TC Heartland decision; (3) transfer would not be prejudicial as 
the case was in an early procedural stature; and (4) trial was not 
immediately impending.265 Therefore, the court found that the 
defendant had not waived its venue defense.266 
In denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss or transfer in 
Bettcher Industries, Inc. v. Hantover, Inc., Judge Jeffrey J. 
Helmick of the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio found waiver of the objection to venue on the 
 
261 See id. 
262 See id. 
263 See id. 
264 See id. at *4. 
265 See Automated Packaging Sys., Inc. v. Free-Flow Packaging Int’l, Inc., No. 5:14-
CV-2022, 2018 WL 400326, at *4–5 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 12, 2018). 
266 See id. at *5. 
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basis of the defendant’s assent to a settlement agreement providing 
for jurisdiction over the case in the district.267 
5. Seventh Circuit 
Considering a supply agreement between the defendant and a 
third party under which allegedly infringed products were sold in 
Cellular Dynamics International, Inc. v. Lonza Walkersville, Inc., 
Magistrate Judge Stephen L. Crocker of the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin held that the forum 
selection clause in the agreement did not provide for proper venue 
in the instant patent infringement action because the supply 
agreement did not govern the patent infringement action.268 
Therefore, the court transferred the case.269 
Chief Judge Theresa L. Springmann of the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Indiana found in Agri-
Labs Holding LLC v. Taplogic, LLC that, even though the 
defendant objected to venue one month after TC Heartland, the 
defendant waived its venue defense because of the late procedural 
stature of the case.270 Consequently, the court declined to dismiss 
the case on the basis of improper venue.271 
6. Eighth Circuit 
Judge Susan Richard Nelson of the United States District Court 
for the District of Minnesota in Cutsforth, Inc. v. LEMM 
Liquidating Co., LLC noted (1) the mere sixteen days between the 
TC Heartland decision and the defense seeking of leave to file a 
motion to transfer and the lack of underlying strategic tact in doing 
so, (2) the greater prejudice to the defendants in subjecting them to 
improper venue than prejudice to the plaintiffs in transferring the 
 
267 See Bettcher Indus., Inc. v. Hantover, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-406, 2018 WL 1942179, at 
*3–4 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 25, 2018). 
268 See Cellular Dynamics Int’l, Inc. v. Lonza Walkersville, Inc., No. 17-CV-0027-slc, 
2017 WL 4046348, at *7 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 12, 2017). 
269 See id. at *8. 
270 See Agri-Labs Holding LLC v. Taplogic, LLC, No. 1:15-CV-26-TLS, 2018 WL 
437560, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 16, 2018). 
271 See id. 
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case, and (3) the lack of readiness of the case for trial.272 The court 
therefore transferred the case.273 
7. Ninth Circuit 
In Allsop, Inc. v. Ambient Lighting, Inc., Judge Richard A. 
Jones of the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Washington found no waiver of the venue defense on the basis of 
prompt filing of the relevant motion to dismiss and the early 
procedural stature of the case.274 
In response to the plaintiff’s assertion that the defendants 
waived their objections to venue in National Products Inc. v. 
Bracketron, Inc., Judge James L. Robart of the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Washington reasoned that 
the relevant date from which to consider possible waiver was the 
date of the TC Heartland decision and that the defendants did not 
waive the venue defense, as trial was not imminent; though the six-
month delay between the decision of TC Heartland and the filing 
of the instant motions was on the high end of a reasonable amount 
of time, the delay would not prejudice the plaintiff or cause judicial 
inefficiencies.275 Therefore, the court granted the defense’s motion 
to transfer the case to a proper venue.276 
Judge Ronald B. Leighton of the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Washington in Nautilus, Inc. v. Icon 
Health & Fitness, Inc. held that any prejudice to the plaintiff due to 
the passage of time in the litigation or the litigation conduct by the 
defendant was not due to the actions of the defendant but due to 
the TC Heartland decision and the court docket and calendar in 
Utah.277 The court therefore transferred the case.278 
 
272 See Cutsforth, Inc. v. LEMM Liquidating Co., LLC, No. 12-1200 (SRN/LIB), 2018 
WL 847763, at *3–5 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 2018). 
273 See id. at *5–6. 
274 See Allsop, Inc. v. Ambient Lighting, Inc., No. C17-549 RAJ, 2018 WL 828225, at 
*2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 12, 2018). 
275 See Nat’l Prods. Inc. v. Arkon Res. Inc., Nos. C15-1984JLR, C15-1985JLR, C15-
2024JLR, C16-0109JLR, 2018 WL 1457254, at *4–5 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 23, 2018). 
276 See id. at *8. 
277 See Nautilus, Inc. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., No. C16-5393-RBL, 2017 WL 
5952375, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 13, 2017). 
278 Id. 
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8. Tenth Circuit 
Judge Christine M. Arguello of the United States District Court 
for the District of Colorado found no waiver of the defense 
objection to venue in RMH Tech LLC v. PMC Industries, Inc.279 
Additionally, the defendant did not forfeit its ability to make a 
venue challenge by filing the instant motion to challenge venue on 
the same day that the court denied reconsideration of claim 
construction.280 
Judge Dale A. Kimball of the United States District Court for 
the District of Utah found waiver in InsideSales.com, Inc. v. 
SalesLoft, Inc. when the defendant waited multiple weeks to 
supplement its motions to dismiss on the basis of unpatentability 
with objections on the basis of venue.281 
The decisions on motions referenced above found no waiver or 
forfeiture in seventeen cases and waiver or forfeiture in seven 
cases.282 As In re Micron deemed TC Heartland to be an 
intervening change in the law of patent venue, the remaining bases 
for asserting waiver or forfeiture of an objection on the basis of 
improper venue were unchanged by TC Heartland. 
 
 
TABLE 5: 
 
Waiver or Forfeiture Absent Waiver or Forfeiture Present 
16 7 
 
 
279 See RMH Tech LLC v. PMC Indus., Inc., No. 16-CV-01762-CMA-KMT, 2018 WL 
1566839, at *4 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2018). 
280 See id. 
281 See InsideSales.com, Inc. v. SalesLoft, Inc., No. 2:16CV859DAK, 2017 WL 
4280386, at *3 (D. Utah Sept. 26, 2017). 
282 See discussion supra notes 225–79. 
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B. Relevant Date of Venue Analysis in Motions to Dismiss or 
Transfer on the Basis of Improper Venue 
With respect to the relevant date of analysis for venue, the case 
law is unclear as to whether the appropriate date from which to 
determine proper venue is the date of the filing of the complaint, 
the date of service of the complaint upon the defendant, or the time 
at which the cause of action accrued.283 
1. First Circuit 
Judge John A. Woodcock, Jr. of the United States District 
Court for the District of Maine concluded in Presby Patent Trust v. 
Infiltrator Water Technologies, LLC that the proper date of 
analysis as to whether the defendant has a regular and established 
place of business in the jurisdiction is the accrual of the claim, 
provided that the suit is filed within a reasonable time following 
claim accrual.284 
2. Third Circuit 
In Infinity Computer Products, Inc. v. OKI Data Americas, 
Inc., Judge Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected a 
rule of law that would find venue to be proper “when a defendant 
had a regular and established place of business in a district, and the 
plaintiff initiated the action within a reasonable time after the place 
of business was closed.”285 
3. Eleventh Circuit 
In finding venue to be proper in Omega Patents, LLC v. 
CalAmp Corp., Judge Paul G. Byron of the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Florida held “that venue must be 
 
283 CHISUM, supra note 10, § 21.02(2)(g). 
284 See Presby Patent Tr. v. Infiltrator Water Techs., LLC, No. 2:17-CV-00068-JAW, 
2017 WL 5895127, at *4 (D. Me. Nov. 29, 2017). 
285 See Infinity Comput. Prods., Inc. v. OKI Data Ams., Inc., Nos. 12-6797, 12-6799, 
12-6800, 12-6806, 2018 WL 1035793, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2018). 
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determined at the time the action is filed and not at some future 
date in the proceedings.”286 
The decisions on motions referenced above providing an 
affirmative rule held that the proper date of the venue analysis is 
the filing of the complaint in one instance and the accrual of the 
cause of action in another instance.287 Consequently, the date from 
which the venue analysis occurs could use further clarification and 
unification. 
TABLE 6: 
 
Filing of Complaint Accrual of the Cause 
of Action 
Unclear Rule 
1 1 1 
 
C. Pendent Venue 
In deciding whether to adjudicate patent infringement claims 
pursuant to pendent venue,288 courts, as a general rule, refuse to 
exercise pendent venue over patent infringement claims.289 
Nevertheless, the two primary approaches to pendent venue are (1) 
to give effect to specific venue provisions as controlling and 
superseding the general venue provisions and (2) to allow courts to 
determine the primary claim(s) in the suit and then apply the 
corresponding venue statute.290 
1. Fourth Circuit 
Judge Jacquelyn D. Austin of the United States District Court 
for the District of South Carolina did not exercise pendent venue 
over the patent infringement claims in Flexible Technologies, Inc. 
v. SharkNinja Operating LLC because the claims for patent 
 
286 See Omega Patents, LLC v. CalAmp Corp., No. 6:13-CV-1950-Orl-40DCI, 2017 
WL 4990654, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2017). 
287 See supra notes 282–84. 
288 Pendent venue is also known as supplemental jurisdiction. 
289 Wet Sounds, Inc. v. Powerbass USA, Inc., No. H-17-3258, 2018 WL 1811354, at *3 
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2018). 
290 See id. 
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infringement were the principal claims, venue over which was 
improper, and because venue over the other claims was also 
improper.291 
2. Fifth Circuit 
In Wet Sounds, Inc. v. Powerbass USA, Inc., Judge Lee H. 
Rosenthal of the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Texas faced the issue of pendent venue in the instant 
case, in which the plaintiff amended its complaint to add claims for 
trademark infringement following a request from the court for a 
supplemental briefing on venue.292 The court ultimately found 
pendent venue to be improper, as the primary claim in the instant 
case was for patent infringement.293 
3. Eleventh Circuit 
Because the parties stipulated to venue in the district with 
respect to one patent, and the other patents shared with it “a 
common nucleus of fact,” Judge Paul G. Byron of the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida found 
pendent venue to be proper in Omega Patents, LLC v. CalAmp 
Corp.294 
The decisions on motions referenced above found pendent 
venue to be improper in two cases and proper in one case.295 The 
sample size here is small, but the two approaches governing 
pendent venue in patent litigation are well-developed. 
 
 
 
 
 
291 See Flexible Techs., Inc. v. SharkNinja Operating LLC, No. 8:17-CV-00117-DCC, 
2018 WL 1175043, at *7–8 (D.S.C. Feb. 14, 2018) adopted by No. 8:17-CV-00117-DCC, 
2018 WL 1158425 (D.S.C. Mar. 5, 2018). 
292 Wet Sounds, 2018 WL 1811354, at *3. 
293 See id. 
294 See Omega Patents, LLC v. CalAmp Corp., No. 6:13-CV-1950-Orl-40DCI, 2017 
WL 4990654, at *3–4 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2017). 
295 See supra notes 289–92. 
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TABLE 7: 
 
Pendent Venue Improper – 
Primary Claim Rule 
Pendent Venue Proper – 
Common Nucleus Rule 
2 1 
D. Agency Relationships 
Courts generally apply a corporate separateness test, which is 
satisfied if “corporate formalities are ignored” and there exists an 
alter ego relationship between the corporate entities, in suits for 
patent infringement when determining if proper venue as to a 
corporate relative can be imputed to the corporate defendant.296 
1. Third Circuit 
Judge Andrews of the United States District Court for the 
District of Delaware found in T-Jat Systems 2006, Ltd. v. Expedia, 
Inc. (DE) that the defendant could not be found to have a regular 
and established place of business in the jurisdiction on the basis 
that the principal of the defendant resided in the district and 
therefore granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for improper 
venue.297 
2. Fourth Circuit 
Judge Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro of the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected the 
assertion by the plaintiff that venue was proper as to one of the 
defendants in Infinity Computer Products, Inc. v. OKI Data 
Americas, Inc. because venue may have been proper with respect 
to one of the defendant’s wholly owned subsidiaries.298 
 
296 See, e.g., Soverain IP, LLC v. AT&T Inc., No. 2:17-CV-00293-RWS, 2017 WL 
6452802, at *1–2 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2017); Post Consumer Brands, LLC v. Gen. Mills, 
Inc., No. 4:17-CV-2471 SNLJ, 2017 WL 4865936, at *2–3 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 27, 2017). 
297 See T-Jat Sys. 2006, Ltd. v. Expedia, Inc. (DE), No. 16-581-RGA, 2018 WL 
1525496, at *7–8 (D. Del. Mar. 28, 2018). 
298 See Infinity Comput. Prods., Inc. v. OKI Data Ams., Inc., Nos. 12-6797, 12-6799, 
12-6800, 12-6806, 2018 WL 1035793, at *8–9 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2018). 
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Because of the corporate separateness between the defendant 
and Lego Brand Retail in Symbology Innovations, LLC v. Lego 
Systems, Inc., Judge Arenda L. Wright Allen of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that the 
stores of Lego Brand Retail in the district could not be imputed to 
the defendant to establish a regular and established place of 
business in the district.299 
3. Fifth Circuit 
In considering whether venue was proper in Soverain IP, LLC 
v. AT&T Inc., Judge Robert W. Schroeder III of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas reasoned that 
proper venue as to a subsidiary cannot be imputed to the parent, 
unless the corporate relatives act as a single unit, and consequently 
held venue to be improper as to the corporate parent.300 
In Blue Spike, LLC v. Nook Digital, LLC, because the 
defendant and its corporate parent maintained their corporate 
separateness, Magistrate Judge John D. Love of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas held that venue 
considerations of the parent could not be imputed to the 
defendant.301 
4. Eighth Circuit 
While a corporate relative of the defendants maintained a 
physical place in the district in Post Consumer Brands, LLC v. 
General Mills, Inc., Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr. of the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri declined 
to impute such physical place to the defendants because of the 
corporate separateness of the relevant entities.302 
 
299 See Symbology Innovations, LLC v. Lego Sys., Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 916, 933 (E.D. 
Va. 2017). 
300 See Soverain IP, 2017 WL 6452802, at *1–2. 
301 See Blue Spike, LLC v. Nook Dig., LLC, No. 6:16-CV-1361-RWS-JDL, 2017 WL 
3263871, at *3 (E.D. Tex. July 28, 2017), adopted by sub nom. Blue Spike, LLC v. 
Caterpillar, Inc., No. 6:16-CV-1361-RWS, 2017 WL 4129321 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2017). 
302 See Post Consumer Brands, LLC v. Gen. Mills, Inc., No. 4:17-CV-2471 SNLJ, 2017 
WL 4865936, at *2–3 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 27, 2017). 
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5. District of Columbia Circuit 
In Tower Laboratories, Ltd. v. Lush Cosmetics Ltd., Judge 
James E. Boasberg of the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia rejected the plaintiff’s assertion that suit 
could be sustained against a corporate family in the district on the 
basis of the operation of a store by one member of the corporate 
family in the district.303 
The decisions on the seven motions referenced above all found 
venue on the basis of another corporate relative to be improper 
with respect to the defendant(s).304 Though the motion outcomes 
are one-sided, the corporate separateness test is uniformly applied. 
TABLE 8: 
 
Venue on the Basis of Agency 
Relationship Improper 
Venue on the Basis of Agency 
Relationship Proper 
7 0 
E. Burden of Proof in Motions to Dismiss or Transfer on the Basis 
of Improper Venue 
With respect to the burden of proof as to proper venue, there 
was a significant diversion among the courts as to whether the 
plaintiff or the defendant bears the burden of proof in a venue 
challenge.305 
Of the seventy-two decisions on motions referenced above, ten 
decisions placed the burden of proof on the defendant, evidenced 
either explicitly or through decisional language, five of which 
granted the instant motion and five of which denied the instant 
motion306; twenty-five decisions placed the burden of proof on the 
 
303 See Tower Labs., Ltd. v. Lush Cosmetics Ltd., 285 F. Supp. 3d 321, 324–25 (D.D.C. 
2018). 
304 See discussion supra notes 295–301. 
305 See Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 3:17-CV-01076-M, 2017 
WL 6505793, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2017). 
306 See Wet Sounds, Inc. v. Powerbass USA, Inc., No. H-17-3258, 2018 WL 1811354, 
at *1 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2018); Celgene Corp. v. Hetero Labs Ltd, No. 17-3387 (ES) 
(MAH), 2018 WL 1135334, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 2, 2018); Infinity Comput. Prods., Inc. v. 
OKI Data Ams., Inc., Nos. 12-6797, 12-6799, 12-6800, 12-6806, 2018 WL 1035793, at 
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plaintiff, evidenced either explicitly or through decisional 
language, twenty-four of which granted the instant motion and one 
of which denied the instant motion307; and thirty-seven decisions 
 
*3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2018); Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Nutanix, Inc., No. 2:17-CV-00174-JRG, 
slip op. at 2 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2017); Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. FedEx Corp., No. 
2:16-CV-00980-JRG, 2017 WL 5630023, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2017); Am. GNC 
Corp. v. ZTE Corp., No. 4:17-CV-00620-ALM-KPJ, 2017 WL 5157700, at *1 (E.D. Tex. 
Nov. 7, 2017); Post Consumer Brands, 2017 WL 4865936, at *1; Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Co. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., No. 17-379-LPS, 2017 WL 3980155, at *1 (D. Del. Sept. 11, 
2017); Snyders Heart Valve LLC v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., No. 4:16-CV-00812-ALM-
KPJ, 2017 WL 4563076, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2017), adopted by No. 4:16CV812, 
2017 WL 4552517 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 2017); Bos. Sci. Corp. v. Cook Grp. Inc., 269 F. 
Supp. 3d 229, 237 (D. Del. 2017). 
307 See RMH Tech LLC v. PMC Indus., Inc., No. 16-CV-01762-CMA-KMT, 2018 WL 
1566839, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2018); Hildebrand v. Wilmar Corp., No. 17-CV-
02821-PAB-MEH, 2018 WL 1535505, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 29, 2018), adopted by No. 
17-CV-02821-PAB-MEH, 2018 WL 4356789 (D. Colo. Sept. 13, 2018); Peerless 
Network, Inc. v. Blitz Telecom Consulting, LLC, No. 17-CV-1725 (JPO), 2018 WL 
1478047, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2018); Flexible Techs., Inc. v. SharkNinja Operating 
LLC, No. 8:17-CV-00117-DCC, 2018 WL 1175043, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 14, 2018) 
adopted by No. 8:17-CV-00117-DCC, 2018 WL 1158425 (D.S.C. Mar. 5, 2018); 
Realtime Data LLC v. Nexenta Sys., Inc., CV 2:17–07690 SJO (JCx), 2018 WL 
2724776, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2018); Tower Labs., 285 F. Supp. 3d at 323; RAH 
Color Techs., LLC v. Quad/Graphics, Inc., No. 17 C 4931, 2018 WL 439210, at *1 (N.D. 
Ill. Jan. 16, 2018); Automated Packaging Sys., Inc. v. Free-Flow Packaging Int’l, Inc., 
No. 5:14-CV-2022, 2018 WL 400326, at *3  (N.D. Ohio Jan. 12, 2018); Fox Factory, Inc. 
v. SRAM, LLC, No. 3:16-CV-00506-WHO, 2018 WL 317839, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 
2018); Reflection, LLC v. Spire Collective LLC, No. 17CV1603-GPC(BGS), 2018 WL 
310184, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2018); Westech Aerosol Corp. v. 3M Co., No. C17-
5067RBL, 2017 WL 6034222, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 6, 2017); Personal Audio, LLC v. 
Google, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 3d 922, 924 (E.D. Tex. 2017); Nike, Inc. v. Skechers U.S.A., 
Inc., No. 3:16-CV-007-PK, 2017 WL 7275389, at *5 (D. Or. Nov. 14, 2017); Precision 
Fabrics Grp., Inc. v. Tietex Int’l, Ltd., Nos. 1:13-CV-645, 1:14-CV-650, 2017 WL 
5176355, at *10 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 7, 2017); Niazi v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., Nos. 17-CV-
183-jdp, 17-CV-184-jdp, 17-CV-185-jdp, 17-CV-283-jdp, 2017 WL 5159784, at *2–3 
(W.D. Wis. Nov. 7, 2017); BillingNetwork Patent, Inc. v. Modernizing Med., Inc., No. 17 
C 5636, 2017 WL 5146008, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2017); Jinni Tech Ltd. v. Red.com, 
Inc., No. C17-0217JLR, 2017 WL 4758761, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 20, 2017); Regents 
of the Univ. of Minn. v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. 3:17-CV-06056-JCS, slip op. at 10 (D. 
Minn. Oct. 20, 2017); CAO Lighting, Inc. v. Light Efficient Design, No. 4:16-CV-00482-
DCN, 2017 WL 4556717, at *2 (D. Idaho Oct. 11, 2017); JPW Indus., Inc., v. Olympia 
Tools Int’l, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-03153-JPM). 2017 WL 4512501, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 
10, 2017); Symbology Innovations, LLC v. Lego Sys., Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 916, 925 
(E.D. Va. 2017); Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Ranir, LLC, No. 1:17-CV-185, 2017 WL 
3537197, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 17, 2017); Prolacta Bioscience, Inc. v. Ni-Q, LLC, No. 
CV 17-04071 SJO (Ex), 2017 WL 5664985, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2017); Stuebing 
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failed to clearly indicate the party upon which the burden of proof 
was placed, twenty and a half of which granted the instant motion 
and sixteen and a half of which denied the instant motion.308 
 
Automatic Mach. Co. v. Gavronsky, No. 1:16-CV-576, 2017 WL 3187049, at *3 (S.D. 
Ohio June 12, 2017); Galderma Labs., 2017 WL 6505793, at *3. 
308 See Bettcher Indus., Inc. v. Hantover, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-406, 2018 WL 1942179 
(N.D. Ohio Apr. 25, 2018); T-Jat Sys. 2006, Ltd. v. Expedia, Inc. (DE), No. 16-581-
RGA, 2018 WL 1525496 (D. Del. Mar. 28, 2018); Nat’l Prods. Inc. v. Arkon Res. Inc., 
Nos. C15-1984JLR, C15-1985JLR, C15-2024JLR, C16-0109JLR, 2018 WL 1457254 
(W.D. Wash. Mar. 23, 2018); ParkerVision, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 3:15-CV-01477-
BJD-JRK (M.D. Fla. Mar. 8, 2018); Mya Saray, LLC v. Dabes, No. 3:17CV00016, 2018 
WL 1161145 (W.D. Va. Mar. 5, 2018); SportPet Designs Inc. v. Cat1st Corp., No. 17-
CV-0554, 2018 WL 1157925 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 2, 2018); Cutsforth, Inc. v. LEMM 
Liquidating Co., LLC, No. 12-1200 (SRN/LIB), 2018 WL 847763 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 
2018); Allsop, Inc. v. Ambient Lighting, Inc., No. C17-549 RAJ, 2018 WL 828225 
(W.D. Wash. Feb. 12, 2018); Nichia Corp. v. Vizio, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-01453-JRG (E.D.  
Tex. Feb. 2, 2018); Agri-Labs Holding LLC v. Taplogic, LLC, No. 1:15-CV-26-TLS, 
2018 WL 437560 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 16, 2018); BASF Corp. v. SNF Holding Co., No. 4:14-
CV-2733, 2017 WL 7790618 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2017); 3G Licensing, S.A., v. HTC 
Corp., No. 17-83-LPS-CJB, 2017 WL 6442101 (D. Del. Dec. 18, 2017); Soverain IP, 
LLC v. AT&T Inc., No. 2:17-CV-00293-RWS, 2017 WL 6452802 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 
2017); GEODynamics, Inc. v. DynaEnergetics US, Inc., No. 2:17-CV-00371-RSP, 2017 
WL 6452803 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2017); KAIST IP US LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 
2:16-CV-01314-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 7058227 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2017) adopted by No. 
2:16-CV-01314-JRG-RSP, 2018 WL 2731932 (E.D. Tex. June 6, 2018); Plexxikon Inc. 
v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 17-CV-04405-HSG, 2017 WL 6389674 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 
2017); Cobalt Boats, LLC v. Brunswick Corp., No. 2:15CV21, 2017 WL 6034504 (E.D. 
Va. Dec. 4, 2017); Presby Patent Tr. v. Infiltrator Water Techs., LLC, No. 2:17-CV-
00068-JAW, 2017 WL 5895127 (D. Me. Nov. 29, 2017); Treehouse Avatar LLC v. 
Valve Corp., No. 15-427-JFB-SRF, 2017 WL 5564153 (D. Del. Nov. 20, 2017) adopted 
by No. 1:15CV427, 2017 WL 6210506 (D. Del. Dec. 8, 2017); Lites Out, LLC v. 
OutdoorLink, Inc., No. 4:17-CV-00192, 2017 WL 5068348 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2017); 
Patent Holder LLC v. Lone Wolf Distribs., Inc., No. 17-23060-Civ-Scola, 2017 WL 
5032989 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2017); IPS Grp., Inc. v. CivicSmart, Inc., No. 17-CV-0632-
CAB (MDD), 2017 WL 4810099 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2017); Red.com, Inc. v. Jinni Tech 
Ltd., No. SACV 17-00382-CJC(KESx), 2017 WL 4877414 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2017); 
XpertUniverse, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 3:17-CV-03848-RS, 2017 WL 4551519 
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2017); InsideSales.com, Inc. v. SalesLoft, Inc., No. 2:16CV859DAK, 
2017 WL 4280386 (D. Utah Sept. 26, 2017); Talsk Research, Inc. v. Evernote Corp., No. 
16-CV-2167, 2017 WL 4269004 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2017); Omega Patents, LLC v. 
CalAmp Corp., No. 6:13-CV-1950-Orl-40DCI, 2017 WL 4990654 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 
2017); Telebrands Corp. v. Ill. Indus. Tool, Inc.,, No. 17-3411 (JLL), 2017 WL 4157533 
(D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2017); Nautilus, Inc. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., No. C16-5393-
RBL, 2017 WL 5952375 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 13, 2017); Cellular Dynamics Int’l, Inc. v. 
Lonza Walkersville, Inc., No. 17-CV-0027-slc, 2017 WL 4046348 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 12, 
2017); Townsend v. Brooks Sports, Inc., No. 2:17-CV-62-FtM-38MRM, 2017 WL 
6417328 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2017); Eyetalk365, LLC v. Skybell Techs., Inc., No. 3:16-
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TABLE 9: 
IV. MODERN TRENDS IN PATENT VENUE LAW 
In reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit in VE Holding and holding that Fourco 
“definitively and unambiguously held that the word ‘reside[nce]’ 
in § 1400(b) has a particular meaning as applied to domestic 
corporations[, in that i]t refers only to the State of Incorporation,” 
the U.S. Supreme Court unified the application of law as to the 
first prong of the patent venue statute.309 However, the resolution 
of the meaning of the first prong of the patent venue statute in TC 
Heartland has led to a revival of litigation surrounding the second 
prong of the patent venue statute, which is an area of law that is 
uncertain and unsettled.310 
After 1990, litigants rarely debated § 1400(b) because the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that a corporate 
patent defendant “resides” anywhere it is subject to personal 
jurisdiction, VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 
F.2d 1574, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1990), rendering the venue question 
redundant.  But in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group 
Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1517 (2017), the Supreme Court 
overruled VE Holding, concluding that “a domestic corporation 
 
CV-00702-FDW-DCK, 2017 WL 3669548 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 24, 2017); Simpson 
Performance Prods., Inc. v. NecksGen, Inc., No. 5:16-CV-00153-RLV-DCK, 2017 WL 
3616764 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 23, 2017); Maxchief Invs. Ltd. v. Plastic Dev. Grp., LLC, No. 
3:16-CV-63, 2017 WL 3479504 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 14, 2017); Gillespie v. Prestige Royal 
Liquors Corp., No. 4:16-CV-02392-HSG., 2017 WL 3232462 (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2017); 
Blue Spike, LLC v. Nook Dig., LLC, No. 6:16-CV-1361-RWS-JDL, 2017 WL 3263871 
(E.D. Tex. July 28, 2017), adopted by sub nom. Blue Spike, LLC v. Caterpillar, Inc., No. 
6:16-CV-1361-RWS, 2017 WL 4129321 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2017); Diem LLC v. 
BigCommerce, Inc., No. 6:17-CV-00186, 2017 WL 3187473 (E.D. Tex. July 26, 2017). 
309 TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1520 (2017). 
310 See In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1400(b) (2012). 
Motion Granted Motion Denied 
Plaintiff: 24 Defendant: 5 Unclear: 
20.5 
Plaintiff: 1 Defendant: 5 Unclear: 
16.5 
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‘resides’ only in its State of incorporation for purposes of the 
patent venue statute.”  With a much narrower interpretation of the 
first half of § 1400(b) now established by the Supreme Court, it 
was inevitable that challenges to venue would become more 
frequent and require courts to consider anew whether the 
requirements of the second half of the provision are satisfied in a 
particular case.311 
Much of the ambiguity resulting from the TC Heartland 
decision has been resolved.312 Of course, TC Heartland resolved 
the issue of the meaning of “residence” pursuant to the first prong 
of the patent venue statute, with respect to domestic corporate 
defendants; therefore, the disparity in decisions on motions, with 
findings of proper residence in five cases and lack of proper 
residence in two cases, should be coming to an equalization.313 
With respect to the “regular and established place of business” 
element of the second prong of the patent venue statute, the 
guidance from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in In re 
Cray served to effectively outline the requirements for such; 
however, the decisions on motions found a lack of a regular and 
established place of business in twenty-six cases and satisfaction of 
such in only six cases. This disparity will also likely be equalized 
as the effects of the In re Cray decision come to fruition and the 
cases that were pending prior to TC Heartland and purportedly in 
the proper venue pursuant to the prior residence standard but later 
analyzed pursuant to the second prong of the statute are dismissed 
or transferred to a proper venue.314 
The means for satisfying the “acts of infringement” 
requirement, also pursuant to the second prong of the patent venue 
statute, is definitively described in 35 U.S.C. § 271, although some 
latent uncertainties are apparent in cases dealing with the Hatch-
Waxman Act. The disparity in the decisions, with four decisions 
finding a lack of acts of infringement in the district and nine 
 
311 See, e.g., Niazi v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., Nos. 17-CV-183-jdp, 17-CV-184-jdp, 
17-CV-185-jdp, 17-CV-283-jdp, 2017 WL 5159784, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 7, 2017). 
312 See id. at *2. 
313 See supra note 68; see generally TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. 1514. 
314 See supra note 155; see generally In re Cray, 871 F.3d 1355. 
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decisions finding acts of infringement in the district, will steady as 
the actions that were filed under the now incorrect residence 
standard and then analyzed pursuant to the requirements of having 
a regular and established place of business and having committed 
acts of infringement in the district are dismissed or transferred to 
the proper venue.315 
Additionally, In re Micron addressed the issue of if and when 
the venue defense is waived or forfeited; while sixteen decisions 
found no waiver or forfeiture and seven decisions found waiver or 
forfeiture, the guidance from the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit has set forth a definite standard for evaluating waiver under 
TC Heartland and left the forfeiture evaluation largely to the 
discretion of the district courts.316 
The analysis with respect to the relevant date for the venue 
inquiry and pendent venue are issues that arose much less 
frequently than the issues referenced above.317 Also, the decisions 
with respect to agency relationships and foreign defendants were 
unanimous in finding venue to be improper and proper, 
respectively.318 
Therefore, the remaining issue to be clarified by the courts was 
the burden of proof inquiry.319 The decisions as to where to place 
the burden in a venue challenge were significantly disparate among 
the courts following TC Heartland.320 The burden was placed on 
the defendant in ten decisions on motions, five of which were 
granted and five of which were denied. On the other hand, the 
burden was placed on the plaintiff in twenty-five decisions on 
motions, twenty-four of which were granted and one of which was 
denied. The placement of the burden was unclear in thirty-seven 
 
315 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012); see also Celgene Corp. v. Hetero Labs Ltd., No. 17-
3387 (ES) (MAH), 2018 WL 1135334 (D.N.J. Mar. 2, 2018); Galderma Labs., L.P. v. 
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 3:17-CV-01076-M, 2017 WL 6505793 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 
2017); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., No. 17-379-LPS, 2017 WL 
3980155 (D. Del. Sept. 11, 2017); supra note 218. 
316 See supra note 280; see generally In re Micron Tech., Inc., 875 F.2d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 
2017). 
317 See discussion supra notes 285, 293. 
318 See discussion supra notes 161, 302. 
319 See discussion supra notes 304–06. 
320 See Galderma Labs., 2017 WL 6505793, at *3. 
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decisions on motions, twenty-and-a-half of which were granted 
and sixteen–and-a-half of which were denied.321 
Although the placement of the burden on the defendant 
resulted in the same number of motions granted and denied, the 
placement of the burden on the plaintiff resulted in almost 
unanimous granting of the motions, and the lack of clarity as to the 
application of the burden in thirty-seven motions was problematic 
in itself.322 Therefore, a sensible solution to this problem would be 
to uniformly apply the law of the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit to this issue, as, “[i]n matters unique to patent law, this 
court applies its own law. Section 1400(b) is unique to patent law, 
and ‘constitute[s] “the exclusive provision controlling venue in 
patent infringement proceedings”. . . .’ Thus, Federal Circuit law, 
rather than regional circuit law, governs our analysis of 
what § 1400(b) requires.”323 Additionally, given the data on the 
application of the burden of proof in the decisions on motions on 
the basis of improper venue to this point, it seems that placing the 
burden on the plaintiff results in inordinately skewed results, 
failing to apply a burden clearly is not a valid option, and that 
placing the burden on the defendant results in the most even, 
uniform, and equal outcomes.324 Therefore, the best option for 
proceeding with this facet of the law would likely be to place the 
burden of proof in a venue challenge on the defendant in a uniform 
manner throughout the United States.325 
In response to this need for clarification and unification and 
through a petition for a writ of mandamus by ZTE (USA) Inc.,326 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently requested 
additional briefing on the following issues: “(1) Does Federal 
Circuit or regional circuit law apply to the question of who bears 
the burden of proof on a challenge to venue under 28 U.S.C. § 
 
321 See supra notes 304–06. Note that some decisions were granted-in-part and denied-
in-part. 
322 See supra notes 304–06. 
323 In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
324 See supra notes 304–06. 
325 See supra notes 304–06. 
326 See generally Petition for Writ of Mandamus, In re ZTE (USA) Inc., No. 18-00113 
(Fed. Cir. Nov. 30, 2017). 
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1406 in a patent case? (2) On this question, which party bears the 
burden of proof?”327 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
answered the first question by holding that the Federal Circuit law 
governs the establishment of proper venue in a patent infringement 
action and the associated burdens, and the court responded to the 
second question by holding for the first time that, in cases in which 
the defendant challenges venue in a patent infringement action, the 
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that venue is proper, 
reasoning that this placement of the burden comports with the 
narrowness of the applicable statute.328 
The one case in which the court placed the burden of 
establishing proper venue on the plaintiff and also denied the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss (or transfer) on the basis of 
improper venue was RAH Color Technologies, LLC v. 
Quad/Graphics, Inc.329 In reasoning as to why the defendant failed 
in its venue challenge, the court emphasized that the burden on the 
plaintiff is “low” and reiterated multiple times that factual disputes 
must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff at this stage.330  
Therefore, while the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s 
decision in In re ZTE (USA) Inc. should cause plaintiffs to be 
weary of a venue challenge in light of the narrowing construction 
of proper venue in a patent infringement action and the placement 
of the burden on the plaintiff in such a challenge, jurisdiction-
specific, plaintiff-friendly jurisprudence on Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(3) generally may provide a refuge for patent 
owner plaintiffs in an age of stringent constructions of patent 
venue requirements. 
CONCLUSION 
The TC Heartland decision has overhauled the prior 
framework for proper venue in patent litigation, specifically as to 
 
327 See In re ZTE (USA) Inc., No. 18-00113, slip op. at 1 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 20, 2018). 
328 See In re ZTE (USA) Inc., 890 F.3d 1008, 1012–14 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
329 See RAH Color Techs., LLC v. Quad/Graphics, Inc., No. 17-C-4931, 2018 WL 
439210, at *1, *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2018). 
330 See id. at *1–3. 
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where a corporate defendant is deemed to reside.331 This change in 
the interpretation of “residence” in 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) has led to 
a reexamination of the law of regular and established places of 
business, acts of infringement, and the rules governing foreign 
defendants. Additionally, the issues of waiver and forfeiture of the 
venue objection, the appropriate date of the venue analysis, 
pendent venue, the impact of agency relationships on the proper 
venue determination, and the proper placement of the burden of 
proof in venue challenges have been revived and, in some 
instances, clarified. However, the placement of the burden of proof 
in venue challenges is the strongest indicator of motion outcomes 
concerning venue in patent litigation. Placement of the burden on 
the defendants results in the most equitable and consistent 
outcomes, so, in light of the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit’s holdings in In re ZTE (USA) Inc., plaintiffs should (1) be 
cautious to file patent infringement actions in order to conform 
with the narrowing construction of proper patent venue and (2) 
evaluate the disputed jurisdiction’s jurisprudence with respect to its 
treatment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) motions 
generally in order to determine potential susceptibility to a venue 
challenge. 
 
331 See generally McDole et al., supra note 8. 
